High Crimes: Liability for Directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations by Newell, Lauren A.
Ohio Northern University 
DigitalCommons@ONU 
Law Faculty Scholarship Pettit College of Law 
Spring 2020 
High Crimes: Liability for Directors of Retail Marijuana 
Corporations 
Lauren A. Newell 
Ohio Northern University, l-newell@onu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/law_faculty 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Securities 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Newell, High Crimes: Liability for Directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations, 16 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 
419 (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Pettit College of Law at DigitalCommons@ONU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ONU. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@onu.edu. 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS
VOLUME 16 SPRING 2020 NUMBER 2
HIGH CRIMES: LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS OF
RETAIL MARIJUANA CORPORATIONS
LAUREN A. NEWELL*
We aspire to lead, legitimize and define the future of
our industry by building the world’s most trusted can-
nabis company.1
I think the current situation is . . . untenable and re-
ally has to be addressed. It’s almost like a backdoor
nullification of federal law.2
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
I. THE MARIJUANA LAWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422
A. Federal Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
B. State Marijuana Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
C. Federal Preemption of the Marijuana Laws . . . . . . 431
D. The Illegal Purpose and Ultra Vires Doctrines . . . 435
II. SOURCES OF LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS OF RETAIL
MARIJUANA CORPORATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Claude W. Pettit College
of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Georgetown University. I would like
to thank Professor Eric Chaffee for providing such helpful comments on
short notice, and Gloria Dicke, Jake Diviney, Haley Dotson, and Julie Tucker
for their excellent research assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Rodney
Salvati, who is always willing to help, and from whom I’ve learned so much.
1. TILRAY, https://www.tilray.com/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2019).
2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of William Barr to Be Attorney
General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (C-SPAN
broadcast Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?456626-1/attor-
ney-general-nominee-william-barr-confirmation-hearing&start=14049 (re-
marks of Mr. William Barr, Nominee).
419
420 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 16:419
A. Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty . . . . . . . . . . 440
1. The Business Judgment Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
2. Exculpation Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
3. Indemnification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
4. D&O Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
5. Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
a. Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto . . 454
b. Shareholder Consent or
Ratification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
c. Non-Marijuana-Related Conduct . . . . 460
B. Criminal Aiding and Abetting Liability . . . . . . . . . 461
C. RICO Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
D. Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws . . . . . . 466
1. Registering Securities of Retail Marijuana
Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
a. Registration of Retail Marijuana
Corporations’ Securities Generally . . 467
b. Tilray’s Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
2. Rule 10b-5 Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
a. Cause of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
i. Manipulation or Deception . . . . . 475
ii. “In Connection with”
Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
iii. Scienter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
iv. In Pari Delicto Defense . . . . . . . . . 481
v. Bespeaks Caution Doctrine/
Forward Looking Statement
Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
b. Application to Directors of Retail
Marijuana Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
1. Section 11 Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
a. Cause of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
b. Application to Directors of Retail
Marijuana Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
INTRODUCTION
Selling retail marijuana in the United States is illegal—or
is it? A rising number of states have legalized the retail sale of
marijuana and are busily regulating these sales and the compa-
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nies that make them.3 At the same time, the sale of marijuana
is a federal crime.4 Are companies that sell retail marijuana
duly sanctioned, productive contributors to their state econo-
mies, or are they felons just waiting for the wheels of justice to
turn in their direction? Right now, no one can answer that
question with certainty.5
What is certain is that more companies are being formed
each day for the purpose of selling retail marijuana.6 Many of
the businesses established for the cultivation, production,
and/or distribution of retail marijuana are formed as corpora-
tions (“Retail Marijuana Corporations”).7 The majority of Re-
tail Marijuana Corporations are small businesses with one or
only a few shareholders; a few are publicly traded and even
listed on the major U.S. stock exchanges.8 Large or small, Re-
tail Marijuana Corporations are governed by the same state
laws that govern corporations formed for other purposes and
3. See infra Section I.B. regarding state retail laws legalizing retail mari-
juana sales.
4. See infra Section I.A. about the legal status of marijuana sales under
federal law.
5. See infra Section I.C. concerning federal preemption of state mari-
juana laws.
6. For example, as of January 29, 2020, there were 580 active licenses for
retail marijuana retailers in California. BUREAU OF CANNABIS CONTROL CAL.,
https://aca5.accela.com/bcc/customization/bcc/cap/licenseSearch.aspx
(search performed Jan. 29, 2020). California began issuing temporary li-
censes to marijuana retailers in December 2017. California Issues First Licenses
for Its Legal Pot Market, NBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nbcnews
.com/storyline/legal-pot/california-issues-first-licenses-its-legal-pot-market-
n829936. There are also numerous companies that engage in the produc-
tion, distribution, and sale of medical marijuana, which is currently legal
under state law in thirty-three states. See Sean Williams, A State-by-State Look at
Where Cannabis Is Legal, THE MOTLEY FOOL, https://www.fool.com/invest-
ing/2019/08/05/a-state-by-state-look-at-where-cannabis-is-legal.aspx (last up-
dated Aug. 28, 2019). This Article concentrates on retail (i.e., recreational)
marijuana because it is the less “sympathetic” type; even those who are in
favor of legalizing medical marijuana may object to its legalization for recre-
ational use. Moreover, retail marijuana is less likely to be legalized at the
federal level in the near term than medical marijuana is, which means retail
marijuana sales may remain a thorny issue for longer.
7. For example, of the 580 active marijuana retailer licenses in Califor-
nia as of January 29, 2020, 439 were issued to corporations. BUREAU OF CAN-
NABIS CONTROL CAL., supra note 6.
8. See infra Section II.D.1 regarding registration of Retail Marijuana Cor-
porations’ securities.
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are subject to the same federal criminal statutes and securities
laws. This means that, like other corporations, Retail Mari-
juana Corporations are governed by boards of directors who
owe their companies the traditional duties of loyalty and care.9
What sets the directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations apart
from other directors is their precarious legal circumstances.
Directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations sit at the helm of
companies that are knowingly violating federal law. In oversee-
ing these companies’ businesses and guiding them toward
profitability, these directors may be subject to substantial crim-
inal and civil liability.
This Article examines the potential liability of Retail Mari-
juana Corporations’ directors under state and federal laws.
Part I provides a brief outline of the laws regulating retail ma-
rijuana at the federal and state level. It then argues that corpo-
rations cannot be formed for purposes of engaging in the re-
tail marijuana business under state law doctrines forbidding
incorporation for illegal purposes and acts beyond the corpo-
rations’ powers. Part II surveys the various sources of liability
directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations face. It first ad-
dresses liability for breach of fiduciary duty under state fiduci-
ary duty principles. Next, it outlines criminal aiding and abet-
ting liability under the federal statute prohibiting marijuana
sales. It then discusses directors’ exposure under the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).10
Last, it analyzes directors’ potential liability under selected an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Finally, Part III
concludes with thoughts about why director liability matters to
investors of Retail Marijuana Corporations.
I.
THE MARIJUANA LAWS
Marijuana is subject to regulation at the federal, state, and
local levels.11 This Part first describes marijuana’s legal status
9. See infra Section II.A. regarding state fiduciary duty law.
10. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2018).
11. Various localities have their own laws pertaining to the sale of mari-
juana. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO. CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 6-200–220 (2013)
(retail marijuana code for the City and County of Denver). For simplicity,
this Article largely ignores the local laws.
2020] HIGH CRIMES 423
under federal law. It then briefly introduces the state laws gov-
erning retail marijuana-related businesses. Next, it considers
whether the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”)12
preempts these state laws. Finally, it contemplates the conse-
quence of retail marijuana’s legal status on the formation of
corporations.
A. Federal Law13
The CSA, enacted in 1970, criminalizes the sale of mari-
juana.14 Section 841(a)(1) of the CSA provides that it is “un-
lawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance,” except
as authorized by the CSA.15 The CSA designates marijuana a
“Schedule I” controlled substance, meaning it “has a high po-
tential for abuse,” “has no currently accepted medical use in
treatment,” and “[t]here is a lack of accepted safety” for its use
under medical supervision.16 Schedule I is the most restrictive
controlled substance designation in the CSA.17
The only purpose authorized under the CSA for a Sched-
ule I substance is its use in a federally authorized study.18 This
means that the manufacturing, distribution, or dispensing of
marijuana (or the possession with intent to do one of those
things) is a federal crime—a felony.19 Despite repeated calls to
remove marijuana from Schedule I,20 the federal government
12. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2018).
13. For a detailed history of marijuana regulation in the United States,
see Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation,
62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 89–91 (2015).
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904.
15. Id. § 841(a)(1).
16. Id. § 812(b)(1), Schedule I (c)(10).
17. See id. § 812(b).
18. See id. § 872(e) (permitting the Attorney General to “authorize the
possession, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances by persons
engaged in research” and to exempt those researchers from prosecution).
19. Id. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), (D).
20.  See, e.g., All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 15 F.3d
1131 (D.C. Cir. 1994); All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf’t Admin.,
930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Nat’l Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v.
Drug Enf’t Admin., 559 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Respect States’ and Citi-
zens’ Rights Act of 2013, H.R. 964, 113th Cong. (2013); Respect States’ and
Citizens’ Rights Act of 2012, H.R. 6606, 112th Cong. (2012).
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has consistently refused to do so,21 and federal courts have up-
held these refusals.22
While the federal government has steadfastly refused to
remove marijuana from Schedule I, federal policy regarding
enforcement of the CSA has varied in the face of state laws
legalizing medical and retail marijuana.23 California became
the first state to legalize the sale of marijuana for medical use
in 1996 with the passage of Proposition 215.24 Others soon fol-
lowed California’s lead. When President Barack Obama was
sworn into office in 2009, medical marijuana laws had been
passed in thirteen states.25 During his campaign, President
Obama seemed friendly to state marijuana legalization, saying,
“I’m not going to be using Justice Department resources to try
to circumvent state laws on this issue.”26 Shortly after President
Obama took office, Attorney General Eric Holder indicated
that this campaign promise would be the new federal policy.27
21.  See e.g., Denial of Petition to Initiate Proceedings to Reschedule Ma-
rijuana, 81 Fed. Reg. 53,688 (Aug. 12, 2016); Denial of Petition to Initiate
Proceedings to Reschedule Marijuana, 76 Fed. Reg. 40,552 (July 8, 2011).
22. See, e.g., Americans for Safe Access v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 706 F.3d
438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding the federal Drug Enforcement Agency’s
denial of a petition to reschedule marijuana survived review under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard).
23. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 86–90 (discussing fluctua-
tions in the federal government’s degree of antagonism toward marijuana
following President Obama’s election); Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana
Industry’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511,
524–28 (2015) (calling the federal government’s responses to state mari-
juana laws “inconsistent” and describing the various responses).
24. 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 215 (codified as the Compassionate Use
Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007)).
25. See 28 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC: Laws, Fees, and Possession
Limits, PROCON, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?re
sourceID=000881 (last updated Feb. 24, 2017, 3:18 PM) (listing California
(1996), Alaska (1998), Oregon (1998), Washington (1998), Maine (1999),
Nevada (2000), Colorado (2000), Hawaii (2000), Montana (2004), Vermont
(2004), Rhode Island (2006), New Mexico (2007), and Michigan (2008) as
having medical marijuana laws in place prior to 2009).
26. Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/obamas-war-on-pot-20120216
(quoting President Obama).
27.  See Stu Woo & Justin Scheck, California Marijuana Dispensaries Cheer
U.S. Shift on Raids, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB123656023550966719 (“The attorney general signaled re-
cently that states will be able to set their own medical-marijuana laws, which
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Soon thereafter, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden re-
leased a memorandum to U.S. attorneys in states that had le-
galized medical marijuana discouraging prosecution of “indi-
viduals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compli-
ance with existing state laws providing for the medical use of
marijuana.”28 Thus, all signs from the early days of the Obama
presidency indicated that the federal government would not
enforce the CSA in states that legalized marijuana sales.
Despite these early indications, the federal government
did not turn out to be as friendly to marijuana businesses as
anticipated. A new Department of Justice memorandum from
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to U.S. attorneys in
2011 declared that “[t]he Department of Justice is committed
to the enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act in all
States” and that
[t]he Ogden Memorandum was never intended to
shield [commercial marijuana] activities from federal
enforcement action and prosecution, even where
those activities purport to comply with state law. Per-
sons who are in the business of cultivating, selling or
distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly fa-
cilitate such activities, are in violation of the Con-
trolled Substances Act, regardless of state law.29
A wave of enforcement actions in California,30 Montana,31
President Barack Obama said during his campaign that he supported. What
Mr. Obama said then ‘is now American policy,’ Mr. Holder said.”).
28.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS IN STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA 2
(Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/
2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf.
29.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
MEMORANDUM FOR UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING THE
OGDEN MEMO IN JURISDICTIONS SEEKING TO AUTHORIZE MARIJUANA FOR MEDI-
CAL USE 1–2 (June 29, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf.
30. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.,
California’s Top Federal Law Enforcement Officials Announce Enforcement
Actions Against State’s Widespread and Illegal Marijuana Industry (Oct. 7,
2011) (https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/cac/Pressroom/2011/144a
.html) (describing “coordinated enforcement actions targeting the illegal
operations of the commercial marijuana industry in California”).
31. See John S. Adams, Medicinal Marijuana Raids in Montana Stun Advo-
cates, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-03-
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and Colorado32 followed shortly thereafter. But, after Colo-
rado and Washington State passed initiatives permitting recre-
ational marijuana sales,33 a third memorandum in 2013 from
Deputy Attorney General Cole suggested that the federal gov-
ernment would permit those laws to stand and would not seek
to enforce the CSA against those operating in compliance with
state laws.34
Federal priorities appeared to change again during the
Trump administration. In January 2018, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions rescinded all earlier guidance on federal enforcement
of the marijuana laws and directed federal prosecutors to “fol-
low the well-established principles that govern all federal pros-
ecutions . . . including federal law enforcement priorities set
by the Attorney General, the seriousness of the crime, the de-
terrent effect of criminal prosecution, and the cumulative im-
pact of particular crimes on the community.”35 Yet, in June
2018, President Donald Trump appeared to break with his at-
torney general, indicating he would likely support a Senate bill
that would largely exempt marijuana from the CSA in states
that have passed their own laws regulating marijuana produc-
tion and sales (the Strengthening the Tenth Amendment
Through Entrusting States Act (“STATES Act”)).36 Sessions’
18-medmarijuanaraids18_ST_N.pdf (last updated Mar. 18, 2011, 12:16 AM)
(reporting twenty-six raids on Montana’s medical marijuana facilities across
thirteen cities).
32. See Medical Marijuana Crackdown in Colorado: 10 More Dispensaries Near
Schools Forced to Shut Down, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2012/09/19/medical-marijuana-crackdo_n_1896385.html (last up-
dated Sept. 19, 2012, 9:50 AM) (noting that fifty-seven Colorado medical
marijuana dispensaries located near schools had complied with orders from
U.S. Attorney John Walsh to shut down since January 2012).
33. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
34. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MA-
RIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 2–3 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (suggesting the Department
of Justice would not challenge state laws legalizing marijuana unless “state
enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust to protect against the harms”
identified as the federal government’s enforcement priorities).
35. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORAN-
DUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 1 (Jan. 4,
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download.
36. Eileen Sullivan, Trump Says He’s Likely to Back Marijuana Bill, in Appar-
ent Break with Sessions, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
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successor, Attorney General William Barr, said during his con-
firmation hearings in January 2019 that, although he finds the
current failure to enforce federal law “untenable,” he would
not “go after companies that have relied on the Cole Memo-
randum.”37 Barr later suggested in testimony before a Senate
Appropriations subcommittee that he would be open to sup-
porting the STATES Act.38
If the STATES Act (or similar legislation) becomes law,
the conflict between state and federal marijuana laws will be
resolved. Until then, despite the ebb and flow of the federal
government’s enforcement vigor, the sale of marijuana re-
mains illegal at the federal level.
B. State Marijuana Laws
Notwithstanding federal prohibitions on the sale of mari-
juana, states continue to pass legislation for its legalization. At
the time of this Article, eleven states—Alaska, California, Colo-
rado, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Ore-
gon, Vermont, and Washington—and the District of Columbia
have passed laws legalizing recreational marijuana sales,39 al-
2018/06/08/us/politics/trump-marijuana-bill-states.html; see Strengthening





37. C-SPAN, supra note 2, at 3:55:08, 3:55:34.
38. Justice Department Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request, at 59:22 (C-SPAN
broadcast Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?459640-1/attor-
ney-general-barr-thinks-spying-occurred-trump-campaign#&start=3498.
39. See State Marijuana Laws in 2019 Map, GOVERNING, https://www.gov-
erning.com/gov-data/safety-justice/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recre-
ational.html (last updated June 25, 2019). The District of Columbia’s mari-
juana legislation technically does not authorize recreational marijuana sales;
rather, it permits a person to possess, use, purchase, and transport mari-
juana, but not to transfer it to another person for remuneration. Legaliza-
tion of Possession of Minimal Amounts of Marijuana for Personal Use Initia-
tive of 2014, D.C. Act 20-565 (Dec. 3, 2014) (codified as amended at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 48-904.01 (West 2001) (effective Feb. 26, 2015)), http://
lims.dccouncil.us/Download/33230/B20-1064-SignedAct.pdf. This leaves
the District of Columbia in a somewhat strange situation, in that it is legal
under D.C. law to possess, use, and even purchase marijuana for recreational
purposes, but it is not legal to sell it. See id. § 48-904.01(a)(1). The situation
in Vermont is similar. Vermont’s law legalizes the possession of limited
amounts of marijuana, but does not permit marijuana sales. 2018 Vermont
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most all beginning with a ballot initiative.40 The ballot initia-
tives for Colorado and Washington passed in 2012.41 Those for
Alaska, Oregon, and the District of Columbia passed in 2014.42
Laws No. 86 (H.511) (January 22, 2018) (codified as amended at 18 V.S.A.
§ 4230) (effective July 1, 2018) (“An act relating to eliminating penalties for
possession of limited amounts of marijuana by adults 21 years of age or
older.”). Legislation to establish a retail market stalled in Vermont’s state
legislature, though lawmakers are set to resume work on passing legislation
in the 2020 legislative session. See B. S. 54 (passed by Senate Mar. 1, 2019),
https://legislature.vermont.gov/Documents/2020/Docs/BILLS/S-0054/S-
0054%20As%20passed%20by%20the%20Senate%20Official.pdf; Stephen
Mills, Push for Retail Cannabis Market Revived, BARRE MONTPELIER TIMES ARGUS
(Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.timesargus.com/news/local/push-for-retail-can-
nabis-market-revived/article_baebf697-0425-5b4a-9894-68c6786edd09.html;
Wilson Ring, Vermont, New Hampshire Both Could Delay Marijuana Proposals,
CBS BOSTON (May 18, 2019), https://boston.cbslocal.com/2019/05/18/ver-
mont-new-hampshire-could-delay-recreational-marijuana-proposals/.
40. For an overview of the ballot initiative process and history, see K.K.
DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical
Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 228–48 (2005) (describ-
ing the history of ballot initiatives and the relative benefits and drawbacks of
the ballot initiative process).
41. See COLO. CONST. amend. art. XVIII, § 16, http://www
.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2011-2012/
30Final.pdf; Election 2012: Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
elections/2012/results/states/colorado.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2020); Ini-
tiative Measure No. 502 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 69.50, 46.20, 46.61, 46.04) (2011), http://sos.wa.gov/_assets/
elections/initiatives/i502.pdf; Election 2012: Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/elections/2012/results/states/washington.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 14, 2020).
42. See ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, BALLOT MEASURE NO. 2-13PSUM:
AN ACT TO TAX AND REGULATE THE PRODUCTION, SALE, AND USE OF MARI-
JUANA (2014), https://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/bml/BM2-13PSUM-
ballot-language.pdf; 2014 Alaska Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://
www.politico.com/2014-election/results/map/ballot-measures/alaska (last
updated Nov. 15, 2014, 1:36 AM); Legalization of Possession of Minimal
Amounts of Marijuana for Personal Use Initiative of 2014, D.C. Act 20-565
(Dec. 3, 2014) (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 48-904.01 (2014) ; 2014
District of Columbia Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico
.com/2014-election/results/map/ballot-measures/district-of-columbia (last
updated Nov. 15, 2014, 1:36 AM); Control, Regulation, and Taxation of Ma-
rijuana and Industrial Hemp Act, Measure 91 (codified as amended at OR.
REV. STAT. § 475B (2015)), http://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/Docu-
ments/Measure91.pdf; 2014 Oregon Ballot Measures Results, POLITICO, http://
www.politico.com/2014-election/results/map/ballot-measures/oregon (last
updated Nov. 15, 2014, 1:37 AM). Though the District of Columbia’s recrea-
tional marijuana law went into effect in early 2015, an act of Congress effec-
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Successful initiatives in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Nevada followed in 2016 and in Michigan in 2018.43 Ver-
mont’s state legislature authorized adult recreational mari-
juana use in 2018, with legislation set to establish a retail mari-
tively blocked the sale and taxation of recreational marijuana in the District.
See Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 809(a), 128 Stat. 2130, 2394 (2014) (“None of the Federal
funds contained in this Act may be used to enact or carry out any law, rule,
or regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated with the
possession, use, or distribution of any schedule I substance under the Con-
trolled Substances Act . . . .”); see Joseph Bishop-Henchman & Morgan
Scarboro, Marijuana Legalization and Taxes: Lessons for Other States from Colo-
rado and Washington, TAX FOUND. (May 12, 2016), http://taxfoundation.org/
article/marijuana-legalization-and-taxes-lessons-other-states-colorado-and-
washington. However, thanks to an order issued in 2016 by the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia upholding the Local Budget Autonomy
Act of 2012, which permits the District to spend its revenues without first
receiving a congressional appropriation, recreational marijuana sales could
be possible if the D.C. statute were amended to permit transfers of recrea-
tional marijuana for remuneration. See Local Budget Autonomy Act of 2012,
60 D.C. Reg. 1724 (July 25, 2013); Bowser v. DeWitt, No. 2014 CA 2371 B
(D.C. Super. Ct. 2016); Chloe Sommers, D.C. Superior Court Clears Hurdle for
Legal Marijuana Sales, MARIJUANA TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www
.marijuanatimes.org/d-c-superior-court-clears-hurdle-for-legal-marijuana-
sales; see also supra note 39.
43. See Letter from Lance H. Olson, Partner, Olson Hagel & Fishburn
LLP, to Ashley Johansson, Initiative Coordinator, Office of the Attorney
Gen. (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/
15-0103%20(Marijuana)_1.pdf; 2016 California Ballot Measures Election Results,
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/ballot-mea-
sures/california (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM); Marijuana Legaliza-
tion Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 §§ 2441–2454 (repealed 2015), http://
www.regulatemaine.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/initiative-text.pdf;
2016 Maine Ballot Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico
.com/2016-election/results/map/ballot-measures/maine (last updated Dec.
13, 2016, 1:57 PM); 2016 State Election Question 4: Legalization, Regulation, and
Taxation of Marijuana, SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., http://
www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele16/full_text-question-4.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2017); 2016 Massachusetts Ballot Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://
www.politico.com/2016-election/results/map/ballot-measures/massachu-
setts (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM); Michigan Proposition 1, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/results/michigan/ballot-measures/1
(last updated Dec. 21, 2018, 2:06 PM); BARBARA K. CEGAVSKE, SEC’Y OF STATE,
STATE OF NEVADA: STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS 2016, at 14–17 (2016),
http://nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=4434; 2016 Nevada Ballot
Measures Election Results, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/2016-election/
results/map/ballot-measures/nevada (last updated Dec. 13, 2016, 1:57 PM).
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juana market still pending in 2020.44 Finally, in 2019, the state
legislature of Illinois became the first to legalize the commer-
cial sale of marijuana.45 The first retail marijuana sales began
in Colorado in January 2014,46 and state-licensed retail mari-
juana stores have since opened in Alaska, California, Massa-
chusetts, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.47 Maine began ac-
cepting applications for retail marijuana stores in December
2019 and hopes to open its first retail stores by spring 2020.48
Retail marijuana stores opened in Illinois in January 2020.49
44. See supra note 39.
45. See H.B. 1438, 101st Gen. Assembly (Ill. 2019); see Amber Phillips,
How Illinois Became the First State Legislature to Legalize Marijuana Sales, DAILY
HERALD, https://www.dailyherald.com/news/20190605/how-illinois-be-
came-the-first-state-legislature-to-legalize-marijuana-sales (last updated Jun.
5, 2019, 10:46 AM).
46. See Michael Martinez, Colorado’s Recreational Marijuana Stores Make His-
tory, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/31/us/colorado-recreational-ma-
rijuana (last updated Jan. 1, 2014, 8:47 PM).
47. See Kirk Johnson, Sales of Recreational Marijuana Begin in Washington
State, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/
washington-to-begin-sales-of-recreational-marijuana.html; Laurel Andrews,
Marijuana Milestone: Alaska’s First Pot Shop Opens to the Public in Valdez,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.adn.com/alaska-mari-
juana/2016/10/29/anticipation-builds-as-alaskas-first-marijuana-store-set-to-
open-to-the-public; Or. Liquor Control Comm’n, Frequently Asked Questions,
OREGON.GOV, http://www.oregon.gov/olcc/marijuana/Pages/Frequently-
Asked-Questions.aspx#Personal_Use (last visited Feb. 8, 2017); Thomas
Fuller, Recreational Pot Is Officially Legal in California, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/us/legal-pot-california.html;
Gintautas Dumcius, The First Massachusetts Marijuana Retail Shops Are Finally
Open, MASS LIVE (Nov. 11, 2018), https://expo.masslive.com/news/erry-
2018/11/a049dbaa834979/massachusetts-marijuana-retail.html; Kalhan Ro-
senblatt, Nevada Goes Green With Recreational Marijuana, and Alcohol Industry
Wants a Piece of the Pot, NBC NEWS (June 29, 2017), https://www.nbcnews
.com/news/us-news/nevada-goes-green-recreational-marijuana-alcohol-in-
dustry-wants-piece-pot-n778261.
48. Associated Press, Dozens Apply to Open Marijuana Businesses in Now-legal
Maine, WGME (Dec. 13, 2019), https://wgme.com/news/marijuana-in-
maine/dozens-apply-to-open-marijuana-businesses-in-now-legal-maine.
49. See John O’Conner, Illinois Becomes 11th State to Allow Recreational Mari-
juana, AP NEWS (June 25, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/7b793d88f3
c84417b83db0f770854960; Ally Marotti, Illinois Marijuana Dispensaries Sold
More Than $10.8 Million Worth of Recreational Weed in the First Five Days of Sales.
Now, Some Have Halted Recreational Sales Amid Product Shortages, CHI. TRIB.
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/marijuana/illinois/ct-biz-
legal-weed-shortages-close-dispensaries-20200106-xhy3lmtjnzdbnbotfibhpdir
74-story.html.
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The following Section briefly considers whether these state re-
tail50 marijuana laws are preempted by the CSA.
C. Federal Preemption of the Marijuana Laws
When states and the federal government regulate the
same subject matter, the question arises of which one takes
precedence in the case of conflict. This question—the ques-
tion of preemption—is a complicated one as it pertains to
whether the CSA preempts state marijuana laws.51
The preemption doctrine arises out of the Constitution’s
Supremacy Clause, which provides that federal law is the “su-
preme Law of the Land,” such that federal law supersedes con-
flicting state laws.52 Courts have found preemption to occur
when Congress includes express preemption language within a
statute, when “Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the
field,’” when it is impossible to comply simultaneously with
both state and federal law, and when the state law frustrates
the purpose or operation of the federal law.53 Thus, the CSA
could preempt state marijuana laws if it were found that an
impermissible “conflict” (in any of these senses) exists between
the state laws and the CSA.54
Countervailing the preemption doctrine is the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine, which prevents
the federal government from forcing states to enact laws or
requiring state officers to assist in enforcing federal laws within
the state.55 Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, “[a] state
50. All of the states that have legalized recreational marijuana sales have
also legalized sales of medical marijuana. See State Medical Marijuana Laws,
NCSL (Oct. 16, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-
marijuana-laws.aspx. To avoid any confounding issues, this Article focuses on
retail marijuana sales. See also supra note 6.
51. As constitutional law is not this Article’s focus, the discussion of pre-
emption herein is brief. For an in-depth discussion of the preemption issues
described in this Section, see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 102–13;
Sam Kamin, Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regula-
tion in the United States, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 158–62 (2012); Robert A.
Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 5, 9–15 (2013) [hereinafter Mikos, Preemption].
52.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
53. See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 105.
54. See id. at 102.
55. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912
(1997) (noting “state legislatures are not subject to federal direction” and
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can constitutionally decide not to criminalize conduct under
state law even if such conduct offends federal law. While states
cannot stop the federal government from enforcing federal
law within their territory, the federal government cannot com-
mand the state to create a law criminalizing the conduct.”56
Accordingly, the anti-commandeering doctrine prevents the
federal government from requiring states to enact or maintain
laws that criminalize marijuana sales.57
Section 903 of the CSA contains express language pertain-
ing to preemption, providing that the CSA trumps state law in
the event of a “positive conflict”:
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to
occupy the field in which that provision operates, in-
cluding criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any
State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless
there is a positive conflict between that provision of
this subchapter and that State law so that the two can-
not consistently stand together.58
Some scholars have argued that the CSA does not pre-
empt state marijuana laws because section 903’s preemption
language is written narrowly.59 Among these, leading constitu-
tional law scholar Dean Erwin Chemerinsky et al. argue that
there is no “positive conflict” between permissive state laws
rejecting the idea that state officers would have to participate actively in im-
plementing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)
(“While Congress has substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, in-
cluding in areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has never
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to
govern according to Congress’ instructions.”).
56. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 103.
57. Id. at 102–03.
58. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2018).
59. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 107 (“[T]he CSA does
not preempt more lenient state marijuana laws because such state laws are
consistent with the CSA’s purposes and objectives.”); Robert A. Mikos, On the
Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legal-
ize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423–24 (2009) (“States may con-
tinue to legalize marijuana because Congress has not preempted—and more
importantly, may not preempt—state laws that merely permit (i.e., refuse to
punish) private conduct the federal government deems objectionable.”).
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and the CSA as required for preemption under section 903
because
[i]t is not physically impossible to comply with both
the CSA and state marijuana laws [since] nothing in
the more liberal state laws requires anyone to act con-
trary to the CSA. Only if a state law required a citizen
to possess, manufacture, or distribute marijuana in vi-
olation of federal law would it be impossible for a citi-
zen to comply with both state and federal law.60
Courts that have applied section 903 in challenges to state
marijuana laws have tended to read it more broadly61 than
Chemerinsky et al. do, although they have not ruled uniformly
either for or against preemption.62 This lack of uniformity re-
60. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 13, at 106.
61. See Mikos, Preemption, supra note 51, at 13–15 (observing instances in
which courts struck down state marijuana laws based on an assumption that
Congress intended the CSA to preempt all conflicts).
62. Cases in which courts found the CSA preempted state marijuana laws
include People v. Crouse, 2017 CO 5, ¶ 8 (state medical marijuana law re-
quiring law enforcement officials to return seized medical marijuana to pa-
tients was preempted because of a positive conflict with the CSA); Garcia v.
Tractor Supply Co., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1230 (D.N.M. 2016) (finding state
medical marijuana laws did not compel employer to accommodate em-
ployee’s medical marijuana use because of conflict with the CSA); Forest
City Residential Mgmt. ex rel. Plymouth Square Dividend Hous. Ass’n v. Beas-
ley, 71 F. Supp. 3d 715, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (state medical marijuana stat-
ute conflicted with CSA and was therefore preempted); Montana Caregivers
Ass’n v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1148 (D. Mont. 2012), aff’d, 526
F. App’x 756 (9th Cir. 2013) (medical marijuana raid was not unconstitu-
tional because CSA trumped state medical marijuana statute); and Emerald
Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 529 (Or.
2010) (state statute affirmatively authorizing medical marijuana use was pre-
empted as an obstacle to the implementation of the CSA’s purposes and
objectives). Courts finding no preemption include In re Rent-Rite Super
Kegs West Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 805 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) (finding no pre-
emption of the Retail Marijuana Amendment or the section of Colorado’s
constitution authorizing medical marijuana use because “both make it clear
that their provisions apply to state law only” and “[a]bsent from either enact-
ment is any effort to impede the enforcement of federal law” (footnote omit-
ted) (citation omitted)); Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, 347 P.3d 136, 141 (Ariz.
2015) (finding no preemption of state medical marijuana statute by the CSA
for lack of a positive conflict and commenting that “the CSA does not ex-
pressly preempt state drug laws or exclusively govern the field”); Kirby v.
County of Fresno, 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 832 (Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied,
2016 Cal. Lexis 1002 (2016) (state statute preventing arrest of medical mari-
juana users with a qualifying identification card for certain medical mari-
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flects the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet spoken
definitively on this issue.63 The Court’s ultimate ruling
on the CSA’s preemptive power is somewhat difficult to
predict.64
juana-related activities was not preempted by the CSA); and Ter Beek v. City
of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Mich. 2014) (state medical marijuana
statute was not preempted because there was no positive conflict with the
CSA).
63. The Supreme Court has touched upon the CSA’s preemptive power
in Gonzales v. Raich, in which the Court held that the CSA was a valid use of
Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, even as applied
to use of medical marijuana that was permitted under California law. Gonza-
les v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2005). Some courts have relied upon Raich in
suggesting that the CSA generally preempts state law regulating marijuana.
See, e.g., United States v. McWilliams, 138 F. App’x 1, 2 (9th Cir. 2005) (stat-
ing Raich forecloses the argument that compliance with state medical mari-
juana act provides a shield against criminal liability under the CSA and sug-
gesting the CSA preempts state law); United States v. Washington, 887 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1100 (D. Mont. 2012) (stating that, after Raich, “under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution there is no viable Tenth Amendment
claim based on federal prosecution of marijuana distribution activity that is
legal under state law”). Yet the Court in Raich did not expressly state that the
California law was preempted; based on this, other courts have declined to
interpret Raich as standing for the proposition that the CSA preempts state
marijuana laws. Accord Cty. of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 165 Cal. App.
4th 798, 825 (Ct. App. 2008); see White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mari-
copa Cty., 386 P.3d 416, 429 n.18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (“Raich addressed
whether the CSA’s criminalization of marijuana . . . was constitutional under
the Commerce Clause, not whether state laws permitting medical marijuana
were preempted by the CSA.”); City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68
Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 673 (Ct. App. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1044 (2008)
(noting the sole issue in Raich was not preemption, but rather “whether Con-
gress had the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to pro-
hibit the manufacture and possession of marijuana”); see also Orde F. Kittrie,
Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1449, 1490 (2006) (observing that the Supreme Court did not invali-
date California’s marijuana laws on preemption or other grounds); Mikos,
Preemption, supra note 51, at 7 (noting the Supreme Court has not yet opined
upon whether the CSA preempts state marijuana laws). Further muddling
the debate, the Supreme Court also cautioned in Printz v. United States that
the anti-commandeering rule is limited in scope, observing that it does not
eliminate state officials’ duty “to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in
such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law.” Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 913 (1997).
64. See David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the
Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 625 (2013)
(“[I]t is far from clear that a majority of the Supreme Court will redefine
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In light of the uncertainties regarding the CSA’s preemp-
tive power—and for the sake of argument—this Article as-
sumes that the CSA does not preempt state marijuana laws.
That is to say, this Article assumes that the use and retail sale
of marijuana in accordance with state marijuana laws is legal
under state law but illegal under federal law. Of course, if Con-
gress passes the STATES Act or similar legislation,65 the issue
of preemption will be moot.
D. The Illegal Purpose and Ultra Vires Doctrines
The retail marijuana business’s questionable legality is
consequential for the formation of Retail Marijuana Corpora-
tions. Generally speaking, it is relatively simple to form a cor-
poration. For example, in Nevada, one or more persons can
form a corporation by filing articles of incorporation with the
Secretary of State of Nevada.66 The articles of incorporation
must contain certain required information, such as the corpo-
ration’s name, the name and address of the corporation’s reg-
istered office or agent, the number of shares it is authorized to
issue, and the names and addresses of the incorporators and/
or initial directors.67 Many state statutes require that the arti-
cles of incorporation state the purpose for which the corpora-
tion is organized, but the stated purpose may “include the
transaction of any or all lawful business.”68 Other state statutes
permit, but do not require, a statement of the corporation’s
purpose.69
The statutory requirements regarding a corporation’s
purpose are significant because they make clear the—perhaps
obvious—point that corporations can only be formed for a
lawful purpose. Even the most general statement of corporate
purpose—“any lawful business”—restricts the corporation to
conducting legal activities. Indeed, corporations cannot be
formed for an illegal purpose, or for a lawful purpose that will
anti-commandeering doctrine at the expense of preemption in order to save
state marijuana legalization laws.”).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38.
66. 7 NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.030(1) (effective Oct. 1, 2013).
67. E.g., 7 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 77.310, 78.035; see 8 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 137–46, Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2018).
68. 8 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 139.
69. Id.
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be pursued in an unlawful way.70 Moreover, courts will not en-
force or uphold illegal contracts,71 including organizational
documents (such as a corporation’s articles or bylaws) that
contemplate an illegal purpose,72 or other corporate agree-
70. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.030(1) (2013) (permitting formation of a
“corporation for the transaction of any lawful business, or to promote or
conduct any legitimate business or purpose . . . . [and prohibiting] estab-
lish[ment of] a corporation for any illegal purpose or with the fraudulent
intent to conceal any business activity . . . .”); Smith v. Dir., Corp. & Sec.
Bureau, 261 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (affirming the state
commerce department’s rejection of proposed articles of incorporation that
stated an unlawful corporate purpose); 8 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF CORPORATIONS § 139.
71. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982); McMul-
len v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 654 (1899); Merrimack Coll. v. KPMG LLP,
108 N.E.3d 430, 439 (Mass. 2018); Godding v. Hall, 140 P. 165, 173, (Colo.
1914); see also 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:1, Westlaw (database updated
May 2019) (“[W]henever the performance of an act would be either a crime
or a tort, a promise or agreement to do that act would also be illegal and
void or unenforceable.”). It is important here to distinguish illegal contracts
and those that violate public policy. Both are grounds for refusal to enforce
a contract. See Waddell v. Traylor, 64 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Colo. 1937) (en banc)
(“Courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of terms of a contract
which will result in the consummation of a criminal act, or one contrary to
the public policy of the state.”). However, they are distinct grounds. Not all
conduct that violates public policy is illegal. For example, the Colorado Su-
preme Court has held that a waiver of attorney’s fees in a marital agreement
would violate public policy and be unenforceable if one spouse lacked the
financial resources to litigate the dissolution of the marriage. In re Marriage
of Ikeler, 161 P.3d 663, 670 (Colo. 2007) (en banc). Yet such an agreement
to waive attorney’s fees is not illegal; it is not a criminal act or otherwise in
violation of applicable law. This distinction is significant because states are
able to declare retail marijuana-related contracts as not in violation of public
policy, and not unenforceable on that ground. For example, a provision of
Colorado’s statute declares that “[i]t is the public policy of the state of Colo-
rado that a contract is not void or voidable as against public policy if it per-
tains to lawful activities authorized by” Colorado’s retail marijuana laws.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-601 (West 2018). Thus, in Colorado, a con-
tract pertaining to retail marijuana sales would not be unenforceable in Col-
orado because it violated public policy. It would still, however, be unenforce-
able contract because its subject matter is illegal, as a criminal violation of
the CSA. Colorado’s statute is powerless to change this result.
72. E.g., Smith, 261 N.W.2d at 230; Guy v. State, 839 P.2d 578, 581 (Nev.
1992); C.D. Johnson Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 232 P.2d 804, 805 (Or. 1951).
A corporation’s articles of incorporation and bylaws are considered contrac-
tual in nature. E.g., Brigade Leveraged Cap. Structures Fund Ltd. v. PIMCO
Income Strategy Fund, 995 N.E.2d 64, 69 (Mass. 2013) (“A corporation’s
articles of organization and its bylaws are a contract between the sharehold-
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ments that violate positive law or public policy.73 This Article
refers to this doctrine as the “illegal purpose doctrine.”74
The illegal purpose doctrine sometimes overlaps with the
ultra vires doctrine. An act or contract is ultra vires if it is “not
one within the express or implied powers of the corporation as
fixed by its charter, governing statutes, or the common law.”75
Though courts frequently refer to illegal acts or contracts as
ultra vires, the two categories of acts are distinct.76 An ultra
vires act is “beyond the powers conferred upon the corpora-
tion by its charter”; an illegal act is “one expressly prohibited
by the charter or a general statute or that is immoral or against
public policy.”77 An ultra vires act or contract is not necessarily
illegal, but an illegal act or contract is also ultra vires because
illegal acts and contracts are beyond the corporate power.78
Ultra vires contracts are void,79 though modern ultra vires
cases generally hold that unanimous shareholder consent is ef-
fective to ratify an ultra vires act or contract, so long as the act
or contract is merely ultra vires and not also illegal.80 An illegal
act or contract is not enforceable, even if shareholders unani-
mously consent to it.
The sale of retail marijuana is legal under state law in
those states that have legalized it, but it remains unlawful
ers and the corporation.”); Dentel v. Fid. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 539 P.2d 649,
650–51 (Or. 1975) (“The bylaws of the corporation have been termed a con-
tract between the members of the corporation, and between the corporation
and its members. . . . The articles of incorporation constitute ‘a contract
between the corporation and the state, between the corporation and its own-
ers, and between the owners themselves.’”) (citation omitted) (quotation
omitted).
73. E.g., Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs Co., 298 P. 508, 509 (Cal. Ct. App.
1931) (refusing to enforce a promissory note delivered in exchange for
shares of the corporation’s capital stock in light of a statute prohibiting cor-
porations from purchasing their capital stock, and stating, “A contract which
is either malum per se or mala prohibitum cannot be enforced . . . .”).
74. For more on the illegal purpose doctrine, see Lauren A. Newell, Up
in Smoke? Unintended Consequences of Retail Marijuana Laws for Partnerships, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1360–62 (2017).
75. 7A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 3399,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019) (footnote omitted).
76. Id. § 3400.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 3399.
80. Id. § 3432.
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under federal law. In order for the sale of retail marijuana to
be a “legal” (or “lawful”) purpose for which to form a corpora-
tion, that sale must be permitted under both state and federal
law.81 Logically, then, since selling retail marijuana is illegal as
a violation of the CSA, a corporation cannot be formed for
that purpose,82 and the retail sale of marijuana is ultra vires.
Because the retail marijuana business is illegal, the secretaries
of state (or equivalent agents) in states that have legalized re-
tail marijuana sales would be within their discretion to reject
Retail Marijuana Corporations’ articles of organization.83 State
81. See Ross v. RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 204 (Cal.
2008) (citations omitted) (“No state law could completely legalize marijuana
for medical purposes because the drug remains illegal under federal law,
even for medical users.”); Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 2013 COA 62, ¶ 14,
aff’d sub nom. Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 2015 CO 44 (en banc)
(“[B]ecause activities conducted in Colorado, including medical marijuana
use, are subject to both state and federal law, for an activity to be ‘lawful’ in
Colorado, it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and fed-
eral law. Conversely, an activity that violates federal law but complies with
state law cannot be ‘lawful’ under the ordinary meaning of that term.”); Ille-
gal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “illegal” as
“[f]orbidden by law; unlawful”); Illegal, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1989) (defining “illegal” as “[n]ot legal or lawful; contrary to, or forbidden
by, law”).
82. See also Newell, supra note 74, at 1364–68 (discussing whether the re-
tail marijuana business is “legal” in connection with the formation of part-
nerships).
83. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.205 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-
102-103 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 203 (West 2019); Smith v.
Dir., Corp. and Sec. Bureau, 161 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
This assumes that the proposed articles of incorporation have a specific
statement of purpose relating to the sale of retail marijuana. It is much more
likely that a corporation would have as its stated purpose “any lawful busi-
ness,” or would omit a statement of purpose in states in which such state-
ments are not mandatory. In this case, even if the secretary of state were
inclined to reject the articles of a Retail Marijuana Corporation based on the
illegal purpose doctrine, the secretary would have difficulty doing so. How-
ever, there is an argument that the secretary’s role is purely ministerial, and
that the only question is whether the articles of incorporation meet the re-
quirements of the state’s corporation statute. If the secretary of state’s role is
ministerial, then the secretary has no discretion to look beyond the “four
corners” of the state’s corporation statute to inquire whether the corpora-
tion’s purpose is unlawful under federal law. See People ex rel. Hardin v.
Emmerson, 146 N.E. 129, 129 (Ill. 1924) (“When a statement of incorpora-
tion which conforms to the provisions of the General Corporation Act is
presented to the Secretary of State, he must file it and must issue a certificate
of incorporation to the incorporators; but if the statement of incorporation
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attorneys general could justifiably bring actions to revoke the
charters of Retail Marijuana Corporations in their states or to
dissolve the corporations after they are formed,84 even if they
are unlikely to do so. And, since retail marijuana sales are ille-
gal as well as ultra vires, courts could certainly refuse to grant
relief under contracts pertaining to the retail marijuana busi-
ness or to enforce Retail Marijuana Corporations’ articles of
organization or bylaws, even if the contract or organizational
document at issue had received unanimous shareholder con-
sent.
II.
SOURCES OF LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS OF RETAIL
MARIJUANA CORPORATIONS
Assuming the illegal purpose and ultra vires doctrines do
not dissuade anyone from incorporating Retail Marijuana Cor-
porations in the states that have legalized retail marijuana
sales,85 there will presumably continue to be Retail Marijuana
Corporations with people serving as their directors. This Part
examines the perils of serving in that role. First, this Part ad-
dresses the typical duties of corporate directors when acting
on behalf of the corporation. Then, it considers various poten-
tial sources of liability the directors of Retail Marijuana Corpo-
presented to him is not in conformity with the act, he must refuse to file it.
His duties in this regard are ministerial.”); see also Newell, supra note 74, at
n.123 (discussing whether the filing of an LLP statement of registration is
purely ministerial); c.f. Jackson v. Dep’t of Energy, Labor & Econ. Growth,
No. 297762, 2011 WL 2507840, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. June 23, 2011) (com-
menting that the administrator’s act of receiving and filing LLC articles of
organization is purely ministerial and that the administrator has no “discre-
tion to look beyond the documents actually submitted; he or she must sim-
ply review the documents, determine whether the documents substantially
conform with the LLC Act’s requirements, and, if they do, must endorse and
file them”). But see State ex rel. Gorman v. Nichols, 82 P. 741, 743 (Wash.
1905) (rejecting the argument that the secretary of state’s duties are purely
ministerial and recognizing the secretary is “under no duty to file articles not
entitled to be filed, and . . . [the] court will not compel him to do a vain or
illegal act”) (citing State ex rel. Osborne, Tremper & Co. v. Nichols, 80 P.
462 (Wash. 1905)).
84. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1801 (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-114-
301 (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.14.200 (West 2015).
85. Judging by the number of Retail Marijuana Corporations already in-
corporated, these doctrines are not striking fear into the hearts of those
seeking to start retail marijuana businesses. See, e.g., supra note 6.
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rations face, namely (1) liability for breach of fiduciary duty,
(2) criminal aiding and abetting liability under the CSA, (3)
liability under RICO, and (4) liability under the federal securi-
ties laws.
A. Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty86
The first potential source of liability for directors of Retail
Marijuana Corporations is for breach of fiduciary duty. Direc-
tors are agents of the corporation and owe to the corporation
and its stockholders the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.87
The duty of care requires directors to act on behalf of the cor-
poration with the degree of care an ordinarily prudent person
in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances.88 It applies in the context of overseeing the corpora-
tion’s affairs and whenever directors are making decisions for
the corporation.89 The duty of loyalty requires directors to act
in the best interests of the corporation, not for their personal
86. For more on the impact of state fiduciary duty law on companies that
sell marijuana, see Scheuer, supra note 23, at 537–46.
87. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1987) (“A director shall per-
form the duties of a director . . . in good faith, in a manner such director
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders
and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.”); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.300 (West 1989) (“A director shall discharge the
duties of a director . . . : (a) In good faith; (b) With the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circum-
stances; and (c) In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.”); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348,
352 (Me. 1988) (acknowledging that directors owe fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty to the shareholders); Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., 677
N.E.2d 159, 179 (Mass. 1997) (stating that directors stand in a fiduciary rela-
tionship to the corporation and owe a duty of care and loyalty).
88. E.g., Rude v. Cook Inlet Region Inc., 322 P.3d 853, 857 (Alaska 2014)
(“[C]orporate directors must exercise their duties ‘in good faith, in a man-
ner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion, and with the care, including reasonable inquiry, that an ordinarily pru-
dent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.’”)
(quoting ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (1989)).
89. See In re Reg’l Diagnostics, LLC, 372 B.R. 3, 28 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2007) (“The duty of care . . . requires directors to exercise a requisite degree
of care in the process of making decisions and in other aspects of their direc-
torial responsibilities.”) (citation omitted); ROBERT A. RAGAZZO & FRANCES S.
FENDLER, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 449 (2d ed. 2012) (“Th[e] duty of care encompasses two distinct
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interests.90 The duty of loyalty includes both an affirmative
duty to protect the corporation’s interests and also an obliga-
tion to refrain from conduct that could harm the corporation
or its stockholders.91 Related to both the duty of care and loy-
alty is the directors’ duty to act in good faith.92 Acting in good
faith requires “act[ing] at all times with an honesty of purpose
and in the best interests and welfare of the corporation” and
“a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corpo-
ration and its shareholders.”93 In contrast, acting with a lack of
good faith would include, among other things,
intentionally act[ing] with a purpose other than that
of advancing the best interests of the corporation. . .
act[ing] with the intent to violate applicable positive
law . . . [and] intentionally fail[ing] to act in the face
settings in which director responsibilities arise: oversight and decision-mak-
ing”).
90. E.g., Demoulas, 677 N.E.2d at 180 (commenting on “the principle that
corporate directors and officers are bound by their duty of loyalty to
subordinate their self-interests to the well being of the corporation.”); Shoen
v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1178 (Nev. 2006) (“[T]he duty of
loyalty requires the board and its directors to maintain, in good faith, the
corporation’s and shareholders’ best interest over anyone else’s interests.”);
J.A. Morrissey, Inc. v. Smejkal, 6 A.3d 701, 706 (Vt. 2010) (“The duties of
good faith and loyalty require that a director must not allow personal inter-
ests to interfere with or supersede the interests of the corporation.”).
91. See, e.g., 1 JERRY J. BURGDOERFER ET AL., ILLINOIS BUSINESS ENTITIES
§ 19.06 (2009) (“[A] public policy . . . has established a rule that demands of
a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most
scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the inter-
ests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from
doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of
profit or advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or
to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers.”).
92. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del. 2006)
(observing “issues of good faith are (to a certain degree) inseparably and
necessarily intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty . . . ,” while noting
that gross negligence, without more, does not constitute bad faith) (internal
quotation omitted); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (quoting
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n. 34 (Del. Ch. 2003)) (“[T]he re-
quirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition,
‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’”).
93. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for [the director’s] duties.94
Directors enjoy four primary sources of protection from
personal liability when acting on the corporation’s behalf: (1)
the presumption of the business judgment rule; (2) exculpa-
tion provisions in the corporation’s articles of incorporation;
(3) indemnification from the corporation; and (4) director
and officer insurance. These protections from personal liabil-
ity are important inducements to serving as directors.95 With-
out them, qualified people would likely refuse to serve as di-
rectors because of the fear of significant liability, even when
they have acted reasonably and in good faith.96 This Section
describes each protection and explains why directors of Retail
Marijuana Corporations stand to lose them all. It then dis-
cusses three caveats: first, the unclean hands and in pari delicto
doctrines, which limit investors’ ability to bring claims against
directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations; second, the princi-
ples of shareholder consent and ratification, which authorize
directors’ acts; and, third, whether directors’ non-marijuana-
related conduct could still be entitled to customary director
protections.
1. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is “a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation ac-
ted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest be-
lief that the action taken was in the best interests of the com-
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Robert H. Rosh, New York’s Response to the Director and Officer
Liability Crisis: A Need to Reexamine the Importance of D & O Insurance, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1305, 1317 (1989) (discussing amendments to New York’s
corporation statute to expand its indemnification and insurance provisions,
which amendments were “premised on the notion that without increasing
director and officer protection, executives may not only engage in risk
averse behavior, but more importantly, they may even be reluctant to accept
positions with New York corporations”).
96. Cf. Julianne DeLeo, Note, If the Shoe Fits: Sizing Up the Applicability of
IvI Exclusions to the FDIC, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2016) (“According
to an American Association of Bank Directors survey, the ill effects of bank
directors’ fear of personal liability are widespread. The survey indicated that
almost one-quarter of bank respondents have lost directors, been told ‘no’
by director candidates, or lost members or potential members of their board
loan committees from fear of personal liability.”).
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pany.”97 When the presumption applies, courts will uphold the
directors’ decision unless it cannot be attributed to any ra-
tional business purpose.98 Plaintiffs can rebut the presumption
of the business judgment rule in a duty of care case and cause
the court to apply a more stringent standard of review by show-
ing that the directors acted in bad faith, with gross negligence,
or without an honest belief that the action taken was in the
corporation’s best interests (including by showing a conflict of
interest).99 While the business judgment rule exists as a matter
of common law in Delaware (the leading corporate law state),
many states have codified it.100 The business judgment rule of-
fers corporate directors powerful protection against liability
for a breach of the duty of care because it is highly deferential
to directors’ decisions. When the business judgment rule ap-
plies, it is very difficult for plaintiffs to succeed on a duty of
care claim.101
The consequence of losing the business judgment rule’s
protection is the application of the entire fairness standard.102
Under this standard, the court performs an exacting review of
the challenged action or transaction, with the burden on the
defendant director to prove that the challenged action or
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its share-
holders, in terms of both fair dealing and fair price:
The former embraces questions of when the transac-
tion was timed, how it was initiated, structured, nego-
tiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approv-
als of the directors and the stockholders were ob-
tained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the
97. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (citations omit-
ted).
98. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
99. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Court of Nev., 399 P.3d 334, 343 (Nev. 2017).
100. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.30(a) (West 2003); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN § 450.1541a(1) (West 1989); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B.08.300(1) (1989).
101. See Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review in
Conflict Transactions on Motions to Dismiss: Lessons Learned in the Past Decade, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 967, 972 (2011) (“The business judgment standard of review
is the most difficult for a plaintiff’s complaint to survive a motion to dis-
miss.”).
102. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
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economic and financial considerations of the pro-
posed merger, including all relevant factors: assets,
market value, earnings, future prospects, and any
other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent
value of a company’s stock.103
The entire fairness standard is much less favorable for the
defendant director and is more likely to lead to a finding of
breach of fiduciary duty.104 Different jurisdictions have differ-
ent names and slightly different formulations of the fairness
standard, but the substance is the same: “[t]he essence of the
test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transac-
tion carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.”105
Directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations will have diffi-
culty availing themselves of the business judgment rule be-
cause they are intentionally causing the corporation to violate
the law (i.e., the CSA). As a result of this intentional violation
of law, plaintiffs will be able to rebut the presumption of the
business judgment rule in a suit against these directors. First, it
is axiomatic that intentionally violating applicable law is acting
in bad faith.106 A director who has acted in bad faith loses the
protection of the business judgment rule in a duty of care
case.107 Second, acting in bad faith by intentionally violating
the law is a breach of the duty of loyalty, which makes the busi-
103. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
104. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.
1989) (stating that under entire fairness review, “the challenged transaction
must withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny. . .”).
105. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (footnote omitted); see
Kim v. Grover C. Coors Tr., 179 P.3d 86, 93 (Colo. App. 2007) (commenting
that the fairness tests in Delaware, Colorado, and most other jurisdictions
are functionally the same).
106. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (“A failure to act in good faith
may be shown . . . where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applica-
ble positive law . . . .”); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corpo-
rate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 31 (2006) (“A well established principle
under the duty of good faith is that a manager may not knowingly cause the
corporation to violate the law, even when it is rational to believe that the
violation would maximize corporate profits and shareholder gain . . . .”).
107. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part
on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Wynn Resorts,
Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 399 P.3d 334, 343 (Nev. 2017).
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ness judgment rule inapplicable.108 This is true even if direc-
tors believe that violating the law is in the corporation’s best
interests.109 For instance, it would certainly save the corpora-
tion money if its directors chose to cause the corporation not
to pay its taxes. The good intentions (saving the corporation
money) do not cleanse the bad act (violating tax laws). In the
same way, the good intentions of causing a Retail Marijuana
Corporation to prosper by selling as much marijuana as possi-
ble do not cleanse the bad act of violating the CSA. Thus, the
conduct of Retail Marijuana Corporations’ directors should be
analyzed under the more stringent entire fairness standard in
a breach of fiduciary duty case.
Though this is the result the law calls for, a state court in a
state that has legalized the retail marijuana business may exer-
cise its discretion and apply the more lenient business judg-
ment rule standard of review. As issues of fiduciary duty typi-
cally arise under state law, a state court could potentially de-
cide to treat directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations as not
having committed knowing violations of the law so long as the
corporations are acting in accordance with state law. Also, if
directors are acting pursuant to counsel’s advice110 that they
108. See CDX Liquidating Tr. v. Venrock Assocs., 640 F.3d 209, 215 (7th
Cir. 2011); In re Tri-Star Pictures, 634 A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993); RONALD J.
COLOMBO, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES & LIA-
BILITIES § 2:16 (2019) (“The business judgment rule also will not protect a
director who breached his or her duty of loyalty through a failure to act in
good faith.”).
109. Eisenberg, supra note 106, at 31.
110. In the early days of marijuana legalization, attorneys’ ability to coun-
sel clients on compliance with state marijuana law was limited by profes-
sional ethics rules. See Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or
Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. REV. 869, 899–905 (2013) (describing the ethical limita-
tions on attorneys’ ability to counsel clients regarding marijuana law). More
recently, states that have legalized recreational marijuana have permitted
their lawyers to engage in greater client counseling on marijuana-related is-
sues, while cautioning them to stay abreast of potential changes to federal




lawyers to “counsel a client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning” of
Colorado’s medical and retail marijuana laws, and to “assist a client in con-
duct that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by” Colorado’s mari-
juana laws, provided that the lawyers must also “advise the client regarding
related federal law and policy”); Maine Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 215
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are complying with the law and the directors’ reliance on this
advice is reasonable,111 state courts could decline to find a
knowing violation of law. This could permit application of the
business judgment rule to the directors’ conduct, which would
more likely result in a favorable judgment for the directors.
Such an exercise of discretion would prove difficult in cer-
tain jurisdictions. For instance, in Coats v. Dish Network, LLC,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that an activity cannot be
“lawful” for purposes of a state statute unless it is lawful under
both state and federal law.112 In Coats, the court rejected the
plaintiff-employee’s claim that his licensed medical marijuana
use was a “lawful activity” and that Colorado’s Lawful Activities
Statute prohibited Dish Network from terminating his employ-
ment because of this use.113 After Coats, it would be difficult
(2017), https://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?
id=734620 (“[N]otwithstanding current federal laws regarding use and sale
of marijuana, Rule 1.2 [prohibiting lawyers from assisting in criminal activ-
ity] is not a bar to assisting clients to engage in conduct that the attorney
reasonably believes is permitted by Maine laws regarding medical and recre-
ational marijuana . . . . The Commission cautions that, because the DOJ
guidance on prosecutorial discretion is subject to change, lawyers providing
advice in this field should be up to date on federal enforcement policy, as
well as any modifications of federal and state law and regulations, and advise
their clients of the same.”); Washington State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op.
201501 (2015), http://mcle.mywsba.org/IO/print.aspx?ID=1682 (permit-
ting Washington lawyers to assist clients with conduct that complies with
Washington’s marijuana laws, though cautioning that this guidance “may
have to be reconsidered” if “the federal government changes its position and
again seeks to enforce the CSA against the kinds of activities made lawful
under” Washington’s state marijuana laws).
111. Though it is not an absolute defense to liability, directors are typically
entitled to rely upon the advice of counsel within the scope of counsel’s
expertise, so long as that reliance is reasonable, either by statute or as a
matter of common law. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.450(b)(2) (West
1989) (permitting directors “to rely on information, opinions, reports, or
statements . . . prepared or presented by . . . (2) counsel . . . as to matters
that the director reasonably believes to be within the person’s professional
or expert competence[ ]”); IOS Capital, Inc. v. Phoenix Printing, Inc., 808
N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“While an officer or director may not
blindly accept counsel’s advice to avoid liability, he may rely on such advice
when he does not have knowledge of his actions causing such reliance to be
unwarranted.”).
112. Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 4 (en banc).
113. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5 (West 2007); Coats, 2015 CO 44,
¶ 4 (holding “an activity such as medical marijuana use that is unlawful
under federal law is not a ‘lawful’ activity” under the state statute).
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for a Colorado court to find that engaging in the retail mari-
juana business does not involve a violation of law, and so it
would be difficult to avoid application of an entire fairness
standard of review.
Though a stricter standard of review may be unavoidable
for directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations, it may not
prove fatal. Presumably, a court could find directors’ conduct
on behalf of a Retail Marijuana Corporation to be entirely fair
to the corporation, even as the court recognizes that the con-
duct violates federal law. For instance, imagine that a share-
holder of a Retail Marijuana Corporation brings a claim
against the directors, arguing that the directors breached their
duty of care when approving a large marijuana distribution
contract. Clearly, this contract violates the CSA, and in approv-
ing the contract the directors are aiding the corporation in
violating (or inducing the corporation to violate) the CSA.
The directors are not entitled to business judgment rule pro-
tection on the duty of care claim because they have acted in
bad faith, in that they have knowingly violated applicable law.
The court should apply a fairness test to determine whether
the contract is fair to the corporation. Normally, acting in bad
faith would be highly detrimental to the directors’ efforts to
prove that they have treated the corporation fairly. Assuming
the only strike against the directors was the CSA violation, a
court could still find that they treated the corporation fairly in
approving the distribution contract because they acted in ac-
cordance with state marijuana laws and, accordingly, that they
did not breach their duty of care. Though a fairness finding
would not insulate the directors from other duty of loyalty
claims or otherwise revive the customary protections directors
of Retail Marijuana Corporations stand to lose,114 the exercise
of state courts’ discretion might at least protect directors
against liability for breach of the duty of care.
2. Exculpation Provisions
A second source of protection for corporate directors is a
provision in the corporation’s articles of incorporation that
eliminates or limits directors’ personal liability to the corpora-
tion for monetary damages arising from a breach of the duty
of care. These exculpation provisions are authorized under
114. See infra Sections II.A.2, 3, 4 for a discussion of these protections.
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many state corporation statutes.115 Exculpation provisions typi-
cally apply only to breaches of the duty of care, not to breaches
of the duty of loyalty (i.e., conduct that involves bad faith or
conflicts of interest).116 While exculpation provisions do not
prevent courts from granting injunctive relief for fiduciary
duty breaches, they do protect directors from having to pay
damages for these breaches out of their own pockets. Exculpa-
tion provisions are very common and they are clearly highly
desirable from a director’s perspective.117
Directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations do not stand
to benefit fully from exculpation provisions because of the na-
ture of their corporations’ business. The Massachusetts excul-
pation statute is illustrative. It permits corporations to include
in their articles of incorporation
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal lia-
bility of a director to the corporation for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director
115. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.210(M) (West 2015) (permitting “a
provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for the breach of fidu-
ciary duty as a director,” but not for “a breach of a director’s duty of loyalty
to the corporation or its stockholders” or “acts or omissions not in good faith
or that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law”); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 204(10) (West 2018) (permitting “[p]rovisions eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director for monetary damages in an ac-
tion brought by or in the right of the corporation for breach of a director’s
duties to the corporation and its shareholders, . . . provided, however, that
(A) such a provision may not eliminate or limit the liability of directors (i)
for acts or omissions that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing and
culpable violation of law, [or] (ii) for acts or omissions that a director be-
lieves to be contrary to the best interests of the corporation or its sharehold-
ers or that involve the absence of good faith on the part of the director”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1209 (West 1997) (permitting “[a] provision
eliminating or limiting a director’s liability to the corporation or its share-
holders for money damages for any action taken or any failure to take any
action as a director, except liability for any of the following: . . . . (iv) An
intentional criminal act”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A § 2.02(b)(4) (West 1993)
(permitting “a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to
the corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any action taken,
or any failure to take any action, solely as a director, based on a failure to
discharge his or her own duties . . . . , except liability for: . . . (D) an inten-
tional or reckless criminal act”).
116. See, e.g., supra note 115.
117. Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?,
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1256 (2010).
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notwithstanding any provision of law imposing such
liability; but the provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director (i) for any breach of the director’s
duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders,
(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law[.]118
Thus, the Massachusetts statute’s express terms do not
permit corporations—including Retail Marijuana Corpora-
tions—to insulate their directors from liability if they breach
their duty of loyalty, act in bad faith, or knowingly violate the
law. Since directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations do
breach their duty of loyalty and act in bad faith by knowingly
violating the CSA, their liability to the corporation arising
from their marijuana-related activity cannot be reduced by an
exculpation provision in the corporation’s articles of incorpo-
ration.
However, it is important to emphasize that exculpation
provisions protect directors only from having to pay money
damages “to the corporation.”119 As discussed below,120 suits
brought by or in the right of a Retail Marijuana Corporation
or its shareholders may be of limited success because of the
unclean hands or in pari delicto defenses, which means direc-
tors may be in less need of exculpation provisions in connec-
tion with these suits. Moreover, the statutory language does
not bar exculpation for directors for conduct that does not
arise out of the directors’ violations of the CSA. Presumably,
they could still be protected from paying damages for
breaches of care unrelated to the CSA violations.121
3. Indemnification
The third source of protection from liability for directors
is indemnification. Indemnification statutes guard directors
from personal liability by permitting, or in some cases mandat-
118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 2.02(b)(4) (West 2003) (emphasis
added).
119. E.g., id. Exculpation provisions are not intended to reduce directors’
liability to third parties.
120. See infra Section II.A.5.a.
121. For a discussion of whether any of Retail Marijuana Corporation di-
rectors’ conduct would be considered non-marijuana-related, and therefore
eligible for exculpation, see infra Section II.A.5.c.
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ing, that the corporation reimburse the directors for their le-
gal fees, judgments, settlement amounts, and other costs in-
curred in actions and proceedings to which the directors are
party because of their service as directors.122 Indemnification
statutes typically permit corporations to indemnify directors
who acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed
to be in (or not opposed to) the corporation’s best interests
and who, in a criminal action, did not have reasonable cause
to believe their conduct was unlawful.123 They generally man-
date indemnification for expenses incurred in actions and pro-
ceedings in which a director was successful, on the merits or
otherwise.124 Statutory indemnification provisions typically
122. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.490 (West 1988) (“A corporation may
indemnify a person who was, is, or is threatened to be made a party to a
completed, pending, or threatened action or proceeding, whether civil,
criminal, administrative, or investigative, . . . by reason of the fact that the
person is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation[ ]
. . . .”) (emphasis added); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-B §714(2) (1981) (“[T]o the
extent that a director, officer, or agent of a corporation has been successful
on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action, suit or proceeding . . . ,
or in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, he shall be indemnified
against expenses, including attorney’s fees, actually and reasonably incurred
by him in connection therewith.”) (emphasis added).
123. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.490 (West 1980) (“Indemnification
may include reimbursement of expenses, attorney fees, judgments, fines,
and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by the per-
son in connection with the action or proceeding if the person acted in good
faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not op-
posed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to a criminal
action or proceeding, the person had no reasonable cause to believe the
conduct was unlawful.”); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.75 (West 2012)
(“A corporation may indemnify any person who is a party to any threatened,
pending, or completed action, suit or proceeding[ ] . . . if such person acted
in good faith and in a manner he or she reasonably believed to be in, or not
opposed to the best interest of the corporation, and, with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his or her
conduct was unlawful.”).
124. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.520 (West 1989) (“Unless lim-
ited by its articles of incorporation, a corporation shall indemnify a director
who was wholly successful, on the merits or otherwise, in the defense of any
proceeding to which the director was a party because of being a director of
the corporation against reasonable expenses incurred by the director in con-
nection with the proceeding.”). Directors can be “otherwise” successful if
claims brought against them are dismissed for technical reasons, such as for
lack of jurisdiction. Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 96
(2d Cir. 1996) (applying Delaware law) (“[V]indication, when used as a syn-
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also permit the advancement of expenses prior to a proceed-
ing’s final resolution,125 and may permit broader indemnifica-
tion rights by agreement among the corporation and its direc-
tors and stockholders.126 Indemnification is a highly valuable
protection for directors, whose legal fees and related costs can
total millions of dollars.
This valuable protection is likely lost for directors of Re-
tail Marijuana Corporations. The very text of the statutes—
permitting indemnification for acts in good faith and in cir-
cumstances under which the directors do not have cause to
believe their conduct was unlawful—bars indemnification of
directors engaged in retail marijuana-related activity. As ad-
onym for ‘success’ under [Delaware’s mandatory indemnification statute
provision], does not mean moral exoneration. Escape from an adverse judg-
ment or other detriment, for whatever reason, is determinative.”). In Wal-
tuch, the Second Circuit held that an officer was entitled to indemnification
when his employer paid a settlement on his behalf, since he personally did
not have to pay the settlement amount. Id. at 97.
125. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.53 (WEST 2003) (“A corpo-
ration may, before final disposition of a proceeding, advance funds to pay
for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a
party to a proceeding because he is a director if he delivers to the corpora-
tion: (1) a written affirmation of his good faith belief that he has met the
relevant standard of conduct [for indemnification] . . .; and (2) his written
undertaking to repay any funds advanced if he is not entitled to mandatory
indemnification . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.530 (West 1989)
(“A corporation may pay for or reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred
by a director who is a party to a proceeding in advance of final disposition of
the proceeding if: (a) The director furnishes the corporation a written affir-
mation of the director’s good faith belief that the director has met the stan-
dard of conduct . . . [required for indemnification]; and (b) The director
furnishes the corporation a written undertaking[ ] . . . to repay the advance
if it is ultimately determined that the director did not meet the standard of
conduct.”).
126. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-B, § 714 (1981) (“The indemnifica-
tion provided by this section shall not be deemed exclusive of any other
rights to which those indemnified may be entitled under any bylaw, agree-
ment, vote of disinterested directors or otherwise[ ] . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23B.08.560 (West 1989) (“If authorized by the articles of incorpora-
tion, a bylaw adopted or ratified by the shareholders, or a resolution
adopted or ratified, before or after the event, by the shareholders, a corpora-
tion shall have power to indemnify or agree to indemnify a director made a
party to a proceeding, or obligate itself to advance or reimburse expenses
incurred in a proceeding, without regard to the limitations in [the indemni-
fication statute provisions], . . .” with certain limitations).
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dressed above, knowingly violating the law is bad faith.127
Moreover, directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations serve as
directors knowing that the retail marijuana business is crimi-
nal under federal law; they most certainly have reasonable
cause to believe that their conduct is unlawful. Many of the
statutes expressly prohibit indemnification of directors for ex-
penses incurred in connection with a knowing violation of law,
even when the statutes otherwise expand the scope of permis-
sible indemnification.128 Thus, directors of Retail Marijuana
Corporations are not entitled to indemnification for expenses
arising out of their retail marijuana-related activities.
4. D&O Insurance
The fourth protection that corporations frequently pro-
vide to their directors and officers is insurance against per-
sonal liability, known as director and officer insurance (“D&O
insurance”). Corporations purchase D&O insurance on behalf
of their directors and officers; the policies reimburse directors
and officers when they incur liability from their service as
agents of the corporation.129 Statutes typically permit D&O in-
surance to cover liability for which directors and officers can-
127. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
128. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-109-109 (2018) (“A provision treating a
corporation’s indemnification of, or advance of expenses to, directors that is
contained in its articles of incorporation or bylaws, in a resolution of its
shareholders or board of directors, or in a contract, . . . is valid only to the
extent the provision is not inconsistent with” the statutory limits on indemni-
fication, including under section 7-109-102(1)(c), which permits indemnifi-
cation only if “[i]n the case of any criminal proceeding, the person had no
reasonable cause to believe the person’s conduct was unlawful”); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 23B.08.560 (West 1989) (No indemnification may be author-
ized by the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or shareholders for any “[a]cts
or omissions of the director finally adjudged to be intentional misconduct or
a knowing violation of law”).
129. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(i) (Deering 1995) (permitting corpora-
tions to purchase D&O insurance); COLO. REV. STAT. 7-109-108 (2019)
(same). Corporations may also purchase D&O insurance to reimburse the
company for indemnification payments or other specified losses. L. William
Caraccio, Void Ab Initio: Application Fraud as Grounds for Avoiding Directors’ and
Officers’ Liability Insurance Coverage, 74 CAL. L. REV. 929, 937 (1986); Sean
Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of De-
tails Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1164 (2006).
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not be indemnified.130 Thus, even if a Retail Marijuana Corpo-
ration could not indemnify its directors for expenses they in-
cur because of conduct related to the retail marijuana business
because of limitations on indemnification, it may be able to
insure its directors against those losses.
However, D&O insurance is generally subject to various
exclusions. Not all director and officer conduct is insurable.
One common exclusion is losses arising from dishonest, fraud-
ulent, criminal, or willful acts.131 Losses arising from this type
of conduct are typically expressly excluded by the policy’s lan-
guage; they may also be uninsurable by statute.132 The likely
result is that directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations can-
not be insured against losses sustained because of their mari-
juana-related conduct. This conduct is certainly willful, in that
they are knowingly and intentionally serving as directors of Re-
tail Marijuana Corporations, and it is also criminal under the
CSA. If either the insurance policy or the relevant state statute
excludes insurance coverage for willful misconduct or criminal
conduct, directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations will lose
this valuable protection.133
130. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 10.06.490(g) (West 1988) (permitting a
corporation to purchase D&O insurance on behalf of a director “whether or
not the corporation has the power to indemnify” that director); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.75(g) (West 2012); see also August Entm’t, Inc. v.
Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 913 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
131. HON. H. WALTER CROSKEY ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: INSUR-
ANCE LITIGATION, Ch. 7F-C 7:1677 (database updated Aug. 2018); Bernard
Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1086 (2006); Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, The Missing Monitor in
Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L. J.
1795, 1820 (2007).
132. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 2019) (“An insurer is not liable
for a loss caused by the wilful [sic] act of the insured . . . .”); Aug. Entm’t,
Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 913 (recognizing that California’s corporation stat-
ute “does not authorize an insurance company to cover a risk that it could
not lawfully cover in the statute’s absence. For instance, a D & O policy can-
not insure against willful wrongdoing.”); Mez Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Nat’l Ins.
Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the Directors
could not be insured from losses arising from their willful conduct resulting
in a patent infringement suit where the company induced its customers to
infringe upon a competitor’s patent); CROSKEY ET AL., supra note 131, at
1677.
133. The problem is greater for directors in two scenarios: first, directors
of corporations in states with statutes that prohibit insurance of criminal
conduct (or similar language); and, second, directors of corporations that
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5. Caveats
Though directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations stand
to lose significant protections from personal liability under
state fiduciary duty law, there are three limiting factors to the
above analysis. First, equitable defenses may be available to di-
rectors in suits brought by shareholders of Retail Marijuana
Corporations. Second, shareholders may consent to or ratify
actions taken by directors and thereby eliminate potential
claims otherwise available to the corporation or its sharehold-
ers. Third, courts may be willing to distinguish between the
directors’ unlawful, marijuana-related conduct and other law-
ful, non-marijuana-related acts. This Section discusses all three
caveats in turn.
a. Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto
The first caveat comes in the form of two important equi-
table doctrines that may mitigate directors’ liability to share-
holders:134 the doctrines of unclean hands and in pari delicto.
The unclean hands doctrine provides that a person will not get
relief from a court of equity if his or her conduct has not been
fair, equitable, and honest in relation to the subject of the re-
secured D&O insurance before the corporations entered (or contemplated
entering) the retail marijuana business. In the first scenario, insurers and
the corporation cannot contractually agree to insure against losses arising
out of marijuana-related activity because they do not have the power to over-
ride the statute by contract. In the second, the insurance policy was likely
obtained with an exclusion for criminal activity; unless the insurer agrees to
amend the policy to insure against marijuana-related losses, the policy lan-
guage likely would not protect the directors against those losses. In contrast,
if a Retail Marijuana Corporation sought a D&O insurance policy in a state
without a statute prohibiting insurance of criminal conduct (or, more likely,
in a state in which retail marijuana sales are legal under state law and state
courts would not strike down an insurance contract covering retail mari-
juana-related activity as a matter of public policy), the corporation and the
insurer could agree upon policy language that would protect the corpora-
tion’s directors even as they engage in retail marijuana-related activities.
134. Directors generally do not owe fiduciary duties to corporate credi-
tors, so there is not the same concern about personal liability for breach of a
fiduciary duty owed to a creditor. Jonathan C. Lipson, The Expressive Function
of Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 224, 225 (2007). That
said, directors may still face liability to creditors for fraud under the federal
securities laws. See infra Section II.D.
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quested relief.135 The in pari delicto doctrine is similar. Liter-
ally, it means “in equal fault.”136 As a defense, in pari delicto
prevents the plaintiff from recovering damages arising or re-
sulting from the plaintiff’s own wrongdoing or misconduct;
the court denies relief when the parties “have acted with the
same degree of knowledge as to the illegality of the transac-
tion” and leaves the parties as it found them, without resolving
the claim in either’s favor.137 Because shareholders in Retail
Marijuana Corporations know (or are chargeable with know-
ing) that they are investing in an illegal business, they may be
denied equitable relief and be barred from recovering dam-
ages under the unclean hands and/or in pari delicto doc-
trines.138 However, in light of retail marijuana’s shifting legal
status, there is no guarantee that a court would apply either of
these defenses to a claim brought by a plaintiff shareholder of
a Retail Marijuana Corporation in the context of a state fiduci-
ary duty claim.139
These doctrines also may not apply to shareholders who
invested in a corporation before it became a Retail Marijuana
Corporation. For example, Fortune 500 alcoholic beverage
maker Constellation Brands, Inc. (“Constellation”) has in-
vested over four billion dollars in Canopy Growth Corporation
(“Canopy Growth”), a Canadian Retail Marijuana Corpora-
tion, which investment could give Constellation greater than
135. See Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1269 (Colo. 2000) (en
banc); 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 98 (2020).
136. 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 24 (2020).
137. Id.
138. See Casey W. Baker, Marijuana’s Continuing Illegality and Investors’ Se-
curities Fraud Problem: The Doctrines of Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto, 12 J.
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 110–15 (2019) for a fuller discussion of the
unclean hands and in pari delicto doctrines as applied to investors in mari-
juana-related businesses.
139. See Sangamon Assocs., Ltd. v. Carpenter 1985 Family P’ship, Ltd., 165
S.W.3d 141, 145–46 (Mo. 2005) (en banc), as modified on denial of reh’g (July
12, 2005) (The unclean hands doctrine “should be applied when it pro-
motes right and justice by considering all of the facts and circumstances of a
particular case. . . . [C]ourts have stated that the doctrine of unclean hands
is not one of absolutes and can be used in the discretion of a court of eq-
uity.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Baker, supra note 138, at
112–15 (discussing application of the unclean hands and in pari delicto de-
fenses to securities fraud claims brought by investors in marijuana-related
businesses); see also infra Section II.D.2.a.iv for a discussion of the in pari
delicto defense as applied to federal securities law claims.
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fifty percent ownership of Canopy Growth.140 Constellation is
also working with Canopy Growth to produce and sell mari-
juana-infused beverages.141 A shareholder who invested in
Constellation prior to Constellation’s initial purchase of Can-
opy Growth stock in October 2017142 presumably would not be
barred by the unclean hands or in pari delicto defenses from
bringing a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Constella-
tion’s directors on the basis of Constellation’s marijuana-re-
lated activities, though a later investor could be.143
b. Shareholder Consent or Ratification
The second potential limitation on directors’ liability is
shareholder consent or ratification. Shareholders with knowl-
edge of the material facts can give their prior consent to direc-
tors to act on behalf of the corporation in ways that the direc-
tors would otherwise not be authorized to do.144 They can also
ratify the directors’ acts after the fact. Ratification is affirm-
ance of an unauthorized (or ambiguously authorized) act
140. Press Release, Constellation Brands, Constellation Brands to Invest
$5 Billion CAD ($4 Billion USD) in Canopy Growth to Establish Transforma-
tive Global Position and Alignment (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.ca-
nopygrowth.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/CBI-CG-Press-Release-FI-
NAL.pdf.
141. David Reid, Corona Beer Owner Set to Buy Into World’s Largest Cannabis
Grower, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2017, 10:36 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/
30/cannabis-drinks-planned-as-constellation-brands-invests-in-canopy-
growth-corporation.html.
142. Press Release, Constellation Brands, Constellation Brands to Acquire
Minority Stake in Canopy Growth Corporation (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www
.cbrands.com/news/articles/constellation-brands-to-acquire-minority-stake-
in-canopy-growth-corporation.
143. This assumes that, by investing in a Retail Marijuana Corporation and
working to produce marijuana-infused beverages, Constellation has engaged
in the retail marijuana business as well, or that its directors otherwise have
engaged in conduct that would support a breach of duty claim for knowing
violation of law. The press release announcing Constellation’s initial invest-
ment in Canopy Growth assured that Constellation had “no plans to sell any
cannabis products in the U.S. or any other market unless or until it is legally
permissible to do so at all government levels.” Id. Obviously, a plaintiff inves-
tor would need to point to a violation of law in order to bring a fiduciary
duty claim on that basis.
144. See 3 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 998,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019); see also Alvest, Inc. v. Superior Oil
Corp., 398 P. 2d 213, 216 (Alaska 1965).
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done on another’s behalf.145 Ratification has the same legal
effect as prior authorization, meaning the act or contract is
treated as if it were originally authorized, subject to third par-
ties’ intervening rights.146 If shareholders have actual knowl-
edge of the material facts of a director’s act or transaction and
they give their prior consent or later ratify it, the director will
not face liability to the corporation or the shareholders on the
basis of that act or transaction.147 Shareholders can ratify di-
rectors’ actions or contracts on behalf of the corporation if the
directors have acted without authority or have exceeded their
authority, provided that those actions or contracts are ones
that the shareholders had the power to authorize at the out-
set.148 They cannot ratify an act that is within the directors’
exclusive province under the corporation’s charter.149 Share-
holder ratification may be express, at a duly held shareholder
meeting (or by written consent), or it may be implied under
certain circumstances.150 Ratification can be implied from
words or conduct, including by accepting and retaining the
benefits of an act or contract with full knowledge of the mate-
rial facts, acting in a way that is consistent with adopting the
act or contract, or acquiescing or failing to repudiate the act
or contract.151
145. 2A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 752,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019); see also Edwards v. Carson Water Co.,
34 P. 381, 389 (1893).
146. Edwards, 34 P. at 389.
147. 3 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 998, Westlaw
(database updated Sept. 2019).
148. 2A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 752,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019).
149. Id. § 764; see also, e.g., Milligan v. G.D. Milligan Grocer Co., 233 S.W.
506, 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921) (“Since the stockholders had no power to de-
clare a dividend in the first instance, they could not, by any form of ratifica-
tion of the illegal act of another, impart life to that which they were power-
less to create. Ratification, to be effective, must be by the same body invested
with the power to act in the first instance.”).
150. See 2A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 752,
767, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019).
151. Id. § 767; see also Inn Foods, Inc. v. Equitable Coop. Bank, 45 F.3d
594, 597 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[R]atification can be implied when a principal
with knowledge makes no effort to repudiate a transaction.”); In re Bennett
Funding Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 94, 100–01 (2d Cir. 2003) (implying ratification
where shareholders were aware of the CEO’s fraud and personally benefit-
ted from it); Frank v. Wilson & Co., 32 A.2d 277, 283 (Del. 1943) (“Where
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Generally, a disinterested majority of shareholders is re-
quired to consent to or ratify directors’ acts, as shareholders
holding less than a majority of the corporation’s voting power
cannot be said to have acted for the corporation.152 An ultra
vires act requires unanimous shareholder approval,153 though
even unanimous consent cannot validate an act that violates a
statute or that is against public policy.154 Nor can shareholders
thwart claims against the corporation by creditors or the state
through consent or ratification.155 Thus, consent and ratifica-
tion are primarily useful to directors insofar as they clarify di-
rectors’ authority or authorize a previously unauthorized act,
and thereby eliminate some potential claims shareholders
could otherwise bring against the directors.
Shareholder consent or ratification may insulate directors
of Retail Marijuana Corporations against shareholder claims
that the directors’ actions violated fiduciary duties owed to the
corporations or their shareholders. For example, imagine that
an investor purchases shares in a Retail Marijuana Corpora-
tion that operates a dispensary in Colorado. This investor al-
most certainly could not mount a direct claim against the cor-
poration’s directors for breach of fiduciary duty on the basis
that the directors have caused the corporation to engage in
illegal activity by operating the dispensary. A court would
surely find that the shareholder consented to the corpora-
tion’s engagement in the retail marijuana business by purchas-
ing the shares.156 Similarly, the shareholder would have diffi-
culty bringing a derivative claim on the corporation’s behalf,
the conduct of a complainant, subsequent to the transaction objected to, is
such as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that he has accepted or
adopted it, his ratification is implied through his acquiescence.”).
152. 2A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 764,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019).
153. Id.; see supra Section I.D. (discussing ultra vires acts).
154. 2A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 764,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019).
155. See 7A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 3432,
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019).
156. Cf. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 417 U.S.
703, 710 (1974) (“[A] shareholder may not complain of acts of corporate
mismanagement if he acquired his shares from those who participated or
acquiesced in the allegedly wrongful transactions.”). This claim would pre-
sumably also be barred under the unclean hands or in pari delicto doctrines
as well. See supra Section II.A.5.a.
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since a court would likely find that a majority of shareholders
had impliedly ratified the board’s actions in causing the corpo-
ration to operate the dispensary. (Set aside for the moment
the fact that the shareholders cannot ratify the corporation’s
engagement in the retail marijuana business in the sense that
they cannot, even by unanimous consent, make it legal to en-
gage in that business.)
The same is likely true for shareholders who invest in a
corporation before it engages in the retail marijuana business
and remain invested without objection after the corporation
can be considered a Retail Marijuana Corporation. For in-
stance, Constellation’s October 2017 investment in Canopy
Growth was widely publicized. Constellation investors who
owned stock in Constellation prior to October 2017 and subse-
quently learned that Constellation had invested in Canopy
Growth and still retained their Constellation shares without
objection could be found to have consented to the Canopy
Growth investment. This argument becomes stronger after
Constellation’s second-stage investment in Canopy Growth in
2018: presumably, a Constellation investor who objected to the
Canopy Growth investment had ample time to object or to sell
his or her shares prior to the second stage of investment. Fail-
ing to object and remaining invested with full knowledge of
the Canopy Growth investment could forestall that share-
holder’s individual claims for breach of duty. Further, a court
could find implied ratification by the corporation (i.e., a ma-
jority of shareholders) in failing to object to either of the
board’s decisions to invest in Canopy Growth.
It is important not to overstate things. Not every silence
constitutes implied consent or ratification. Moreover, share-
holders do not have the power to manage the corporation, nor
the right to vote on every business decision the corporation
makes. This power is entrusted to the board.157 The claim for
ratification through failure to object is stronger in smaller cor-
porations, in which shareholders may have more power and
157. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.)
(“[T]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the direction of the
board.”); ME. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 801 (Westlaw through 2019 First Reg. Sess.)
(“All corporate powers must be exercised by or under the authority of, and
the business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of,
the corporation’s board of directors . . . .”).
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can more easily amass voting majorities, and weaker in public
companies, in which individual shareholders may hold only a
fraction of the voting power.
Consent and ratification probably matter most in two
senses. First, to the extent the shareholders expressly consent
to or ratify the board’s decision to engage in retail marijuana-
related activity, they likely close off claims by the shareholders
or the corporation that the board has violated their fiduciary
duties158 by causing the corporation to engage in the retail
marijuana business. Second, the doctrines of implied consent
and ratification provide avenues for courts to deny individual
shareholders’ standing to bring claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, whether direct or derivative, on the theory that those
shareholders have knowingly acquiesced or participated in the
activity giving rise to their claims.
c. Non-Marijuana-Related Conduct
This Section has considered all conduct of Retail Mari-
juana Corporations’ directors as being in furtherance of the
corporations’ purposes of producing, distributing, and/or sell-
ing retail marijuana and, therefore, in violation of the CSA. It
is also plausible that some director conduct would be viewed as
unrelated to the retail marijuana business and, therefore, not
unlawful. For instance, perhaps approving a merger agree-
ment between the Retail Marijuana Corporation and another
company is severable from the corporation’s marijuana-related
activity. If so, perhaps this decision would be entitled to review
under the business judgment rule because it is not a knowing
violation of the law in the same way that marijuana-related de-
cisions are. A director making this decision should also be en-
titled to indemnification for the expenses incurred in defend-
ing it, as well as to insulation from personal liability for mone-
tary damages under an exculpation clause, and to insurance
proceeds under a D&O policy. In other words, the director’s
158. Notably, even unanimous shareholder consent or ratification could
not insulate the board against criminal liability for their marijuana-related
activities. Neither would consent or ratification prevent any securities fraud
claims, discussed infra, on the basis of directors’ material misstatements or
omissions, since the predicate for shareholder consent or ratification is full
knowledge of the material facts.
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non-marijuana-related decisions should arguably receive the
benefit of customary director protections.
The counterargument is that every act a director takes on
behalf of a corporation is for its benefit and helps it achieve its
purposes. If the purpose of a Retail Marijuana Corporation is
to manufacture and sell retail marijuana products, then every
decision a director makes that contributes to the corporation’s
financial wellbeing and ability to achieve its business purpose
is an act in furtherance of the manufacture and sale of mari-
juana. Under this interpretation, every act of a Retail Marijuana
Corporation’s director on the corporation’s behalf is illegal, as
it is aiding and abetting a CSA violation.159
This second interpretation probably goes too far. It seems
unrealistic to say that every act of a director would be consid-
ered a separate instance of criminal activity. Courts would
likely draw some line between marijuana-related and non-ma-
rijuana-related director conduct. But even if some conduct
were unobjectionable, there would remain enough acts by the
directors in furtherance of the retail marijuana business that
they would likely face the consequences outlined in this Sec-
tion. After all, if a person buys a candy bar at a convenience
store and an hour later robs the store at gunpoint, it is little
consolation to say that the candy bar purchase was entirely law-
ful. In the same way, directors who potentially face prison
time, civil damages, and criminal penalties for their actions on
behalf of a Retail Marijuana Corporation would likely not find
it a great comfort that a portion of their decisions would enjoy
customary director protections.
B. Criminal Aiding and Abetting Liability
The second potential source of liability for directors of
Retail Marijuana Corporations is criminal aiding and abetting
liability. Under Title 18, § 2(a), of the United States Code, a
person who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or pro-
cures” the commission of a crime against the United States “is
punishable as a principal.”160 This section “reflects a centuries-
old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a
crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to
159. See infra Section II.B. (discussing aiding and abetting liability).
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2018).
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complete its commission.”161 The Supreme Court has held
that “under [Title 18 U.S.C.] § 2 ‘those who provide knowing
aid to persons committing federal crimes, with the intent to
facilitate the crime, are themselves committing a crime.’”162 A
person incurs aiding and abetting liability for a crime “if (and
only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of that
offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s com-
mission.”163 The aider and abettor need not participate in
every element of the offense.164
Accordingly, it follows that even if directors of a Retail Ma-
rijuana Corporation do not themselves “manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense” marijuana in violation of the CSA,165 they
could be found to be aiding, abetting, or inducing the corpo-
ration to do so, and could be held personally liable for that
crime.166 A Retail Marijuana Corporation would be the princi-
pal that actually produces and sells the controlled substance; a
director of that corporation would certainly be taking affirma-
tive acts in furtherance of the manufacture and distribution of
marijuana with the intent of facilitating that manufacture and
distribution. For example, corporate directors might engage
in activities such as approving the acquisition of a distribution
facility, hiring an officer in charge of sales, or ratifying a distri-
bution contract. Each of these acts would aid the corporation
in distributing marijuana in violation of the CSA, so any of
these acts could potentially give rise to aiding and abetting lia-
bility for those directors. If the purpose of a Retail Marijuana
Corporation is to produce and sell retail marijuana products,
then any actions a director takes on the corporation’s behalf
and in furtherance of that purpose can be considered acts in
furtherance of the corporation’s CSA violations.
161. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 70 (2014) (citation omit-
ted).
162. Id. at 71 (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994)).
163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 73.
165. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2018).
166. See Bourgoin v. Twin Rivers Paper Co., 2018 ME 77, ¶ 16, 187 A.3d
10, 17 (finding an employer would be subject to aiding and abetting liability
under the CSA if it subsidized its employee’s medical marijuana purchase as
required under Maine’s medical marijuana act).
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The penalties for violating the CSA are severe. Manufac-
turing, distributing, or dispensing one thousand or more mari-
juana plants or one thousand kilograms or more of a sub-
stance containing a detectible amount of marijuana carries a
penalty of not less than ten years’ imprisonment, and up to life
in prison, and a fine up to $10 million.167 Even the lightest
penalty, imposed for manufacturing, distributing, or dispens-
ing fewer than fifty marijuana plants or less than fifty kilo-
grams of a marijuana-containing substance, is a prison term of
up to five years and/or a penalty of up to $250,000.168 Because
Retail Marijuana Corporations likely cannot insure their direc-
tors against liability for their service to the corporation,169
these directors will probably bear the full brunt of any mone-
tary penalties assessed. The prospect of prison time and hefty
fines would be enough to give any potential director pause.
C. RICO Liability
The third potential source of liability for directors of Re-
tail Marijuana Corporations is criminal liability under RICO.
RICO provides that it is “unlawful for any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity. . . .”170 “Racketeering activity” is defined as “any offense
involving . . . fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed
chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act), punishable under any law of the United
States[.]”171 A “pattern of racketeering activity” means “a se-
ries of related predicates [specified state or federal offenses]
167. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii).
168. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D).
169. See supra Section II.A.4.
170. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (2018). Further, RICO prohibits anyone who receives income di-
rectly or indirectly derived from “a pattern of racketeering activity” from in-
vesting any of that income (or its proceeds) in establishing, operating, or
acquiring an interest in any enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
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that together demonstrate the existence or threat of contin-
ued criminal activity.”172 Finally, an “enterprise” “includes any
. . . partnership, corporation, association, or other legal en-
tity.”173
The Supreme Court has held that “RICO is to be read
broadly.”174 In Reves v. Ernst & Young,175 the Supreme Court
adopted an “operation or management” test for determining
RICO liability, holding that a person who “participate[s] in the
operation or management of the enterprise itself” is deemed
to have “conducte[d] or participate[d] . . . in the conduct of
such enterprise’s affairs.”176 RICO liability does not require a
formal position in, or control over, the enterprise, “but some
part in directing the enterprise’s affairs is required.”177 Under
the Reves test, a corporate director would clearly fall within the
scope of possible RICO defendants.
RICO claims may be brought either as federal criminal or
civil proceedings.178 Criminal penalties include fines, impris-
onment up to twenty years (or life, in certain circumstances),
and forfeiture of property.179 Public civil remedies include di-
vestiture, restrictions on future business activities and invest-
ments, and dissolution or reorganization of enterprises.180
Moreover, there is a private cause of action under RICO for
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of” RICO, with remedies including treble damages,
costs, and fees.181 Thus, a successful RICO “plaintiff must
plead and ultimately prove: (1) that the defendant vio-
lated § 1962 [RICO’s substantive provision]; (2) that the plain-
tiff’s business or property was injured; and (3) that the defen-
dant’s violation is the cause of that injury.”182
Private plaintiffs have begun bringing RICO claims
against defendants engaged in the sale of marijuana. In Safe
172. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2096–97
(2016).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
174. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985).
175. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
176. Id. at 179, 185; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
177. Reves, 507 U.S. at 180.
178. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
182. Safe Sts. All. v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 881 (10th Cir. 2017).
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Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper,183 private plaintiffs alleged that a
recreational marijuana business located next to plaintiffs’
property caused injury actionable under RICO by reducing
their property value and constituting a nuisance due to the
odor of marijuana, thereby diminishing their ability to use
their property and further reducing its value.184 The Tenth
Circuit found that “cultivating marijuana for sale . . . is by defi-
nition racketeering activity” under RICO.185 It also found that
the actions defendants took to establish and operate their ma-
rijuana cultivation activities constituted the requisite pattern of
racketeering activity under RICO.186 Finding that the plaintiffs
plausibly pleaded nuisance and diminution of their property
value, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the defendants’ mari-
juana operations were the proximate cause of those injuries,
and remanded for further proceedings on the property-re-
lated injuries.187 Though the jury did not ultimately award the
Safe Streets plaintiffs any damages,188 this case opened the door
for private plaintiffs to bring RICO suits against persons in-
volved in state-sanctioned retail marijuana operations.
Cases filed in Massachusetts,189 Oregon,190 and Califor-
nia191 followed suit. Though cases like these—which allege in-
jury to property from nearby marijuana operations—are
highly fact intensive and may not be ultimately successful, they
are worrisome to directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations
for a number of reasons. First, retail marijuana operations
have been held to be squarely within the conduct prohibited
by RICO—a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Second, direc-
tors of Retail Marijuana Corporations would certainly be
proper defendants under the Reves “operation or manage-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 879–80.
185. Id. at 882.
186. Id. at 884.
187. Id. at 889–91.
188. Verdict Form, Safe Streets Alliance v. Alternative Holistic Healing,
LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00349-REB-SKC (D. Col. Oct. 31, 2018), ECF No. 254.
189. Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d
20, 26 (D. Mass. 2018).
190. Underwood v. 1450 SE Orient, LLC, No. 3:18-CV-1366-JR, 2019 WL
2871097, at *1 (D. Or. June 14, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:18-CV-01366-JR, 2019 WL 2870819 (D. Or. July 3, 2019).
191. Bokaie v. Green Earth Coffee LLC, No. 18-CV-05244-JST, 2018 WL
6813212, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2018).
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ment” test, as they are employed by the Retail Marijuana Cor-
porations and direct their affairs. Third, RICO suits are attrac-
tive to plaintiffs because they afford treble damages, costs, and
attorney’s fees. Even if the suits are unsuccessful, they are dam-
aging in terms of directors’ time and attention and negative
publicity for the corporation.
More importantly, though this discussion has focused
largely on private RICO claims, there remains the possibility
that the federal government could choose to institute RICO
actions against Retail Marijuana Corporations and their direc-
tors. This is potentially much more worrisome for directors be-
cause the government need not prove injury; merely violating
RICO by engaging in retail marijuana sales—i.e., a pattern of
racketeering activity—could lead to criminal fines, imprison-
ment, divestiture, and other remedies. That the government
thus far has not opted to pursue RICO claims against busi-
nesses operating lawfully under state law is cold comfort for
those who stand to face the penalties if enforcement priorities
change.
D. Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws
The fourth potential source of liability for directors of Re-
tail Marijuana Corporations is the federal securities laws.192
This Section briefly describes the requirements for registering
securities under those laws. It then considers the difficulties in
listing securities for a Retail Marijuana Corporations on a U.S.
securities exchange. Next, this Section outlines the exposure
to liability directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations face
under two selected antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws: section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (“Exchange Act”);193 and section 11 of Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (“Securities Act”).194 To illus-
192. Although recognizing that Retail Marijuana Corporations and their
directors may also face significant liability under state securities laws, this
Article omits discussion of state laws to avoid duplication.
193. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2018).
194. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018). This Article omits a
discussion of other federal antifraud provisions—notably Sections 12(a)(2)
and Section 17 of the Securities Act—to avoid repetition, while recognizing
that these are also significant sources of potential liability. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a–77aa, 77l. Aspects of the cause of action under Section 12(a)(2) are
similar to those under Section 10(b) and Section 11, including the relevant
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trate the construction of these statutory sections and how they
may prove problematic for directors of Retail Marijuana Cor-
porations, this Section analyzes the registration documents of
Tilray, Inc. (“Tilray”), a publicly traded Retail Marijuana Cor-
poration.
1. Registering Securities of Retail Marijuana Corporations
a. Registration of Retail Marijuana Corporations’ Securities
Generally
No securities may be offered, bought, or sold in the
United States unless they are registered in accordance with the
Securities Act or they qualify for an exemption from registra-
tion.195 Common exemptions from registration under the Se-
curities Act include exemptions of specific types of securities
(such as securities issued by federal, state, or municipal gov-
ernments) and specific types of transactions (such as offerings
of limited size, offerings limited largely to sophisticated pur-
chasers, private offerings to small numbers of investors, and
intrastate offerings).196 Registration under the federal securi-
ties laws brings with it a number of onerous disclosure require-
ments, both in the initial registration document, known as the
registration statement (Form S-1),197 and in the company’s
materiality standard and certain available defenses (i.e., the bespeaks cau-
tion doctrine and a forward-looking statement safe harbor). See Rombach v.
Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 178 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting the materiality stan-
dard is the same under Section 12(a)(2) as under Section 10(b) and Section
11); P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2004)
(applying the bespeaks caution doctrine and forward-looking statement safe
harbor to Section 12(a)(2)); see also infra text accompanying notes 282–290
regarding the bespeaks caution doctrine and forward-looking statement safe
harbor. Likewise, the analysis under Section 17 is quite similar to that under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. There is no private cause of action under
Section 17, though the SEC can bring civil actions under this section and the
Department of Justice can utilize it in criminal prosecutions. Securities Act
§§ 20, 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 77x; Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 12–13
(1st Cir. 1998). Rule 10b-5’s language is based upon Section 17’s wording,
with little difference between the two. Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities
Fraud?, 61 DUKE L. J. 511, 541 (2011). Further, courts have sometimes inter-
preted Rule 10b-5 and Section 17 similarly. Id. at 541–42.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e).
196. Securities Act §§ 3(a)(2), 3(a)(11), 3(b), 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(a)(2), 77c(a)(11), 77c(b), 77d(a)(2) (2018); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506 (2019).
197. Securities Act Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2019).
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ongoing required disclosures under the Exchange Act.198 The
first part of the registration statement, the prospectus, must set
forth a variety of information, including descriptions of the
following: (1) the company’s business operations;199 (2) any
“material pending legal proceedings” to which the company,
any of its subsidiaries, or any of its or their property is sub-
ject;200 (3) “the most significant risk factors that make an in-
vestment in the . . . [company] speculative or risky”;201 (4) the
company’s financial condition and results of operations;202
and (5) the company’s management.203 The prospectus must
also include audited financial statements.204 Thus, a Retail Ma-
rijuana Corporation that wishes to register its securities for sale
on a U.S. stock exchange would have to provide a great deal of
information about its marijuana-related activities, thereby po-
tentially subjecting itself and its directors to the types of liabil-
ity discussed earlier.205
Regardless of whether it is wise, from a liability perspec-
tive, for a Retail Marijuana Company operating in the United
States to publicly list its securities, it is questionable whether
198. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a. Under the 2012
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, companies that qualify as “emerging
growth” companies under section 2(a)(19) of the Securities Act have re-
duced disclosure requirements. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act,
§ 102, Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77g(a)(2) (2018)). A company that has not undergone an initial public
offering of its common stock and that had $1.07 billion (adjusted for infla-
tion) in total annual gross revenues in its most recently completed fiscal year
can qualify as an emerging growth company. Securities Act of 1933
§ 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
199. Form S-1, Item 11(a); Regulation S-K Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101
(2019).
200. Form S-1, Item 11(c); Regulation S-K Item 103, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103
(2019).
201. Form S-1, Item 3; Regulation S-K Item 105, 17 C.F.R. § 229.105
(2019).
202. Form S-1, Items 11(f)–(g); Regulation S-K Items 301-303, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229.301–03 (2019).
203. Form S-1, Items 11(k)–(m); Regulation S-K Items 401-404, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229.401–04 (2019).
204. Form S-1, Item 11(e); Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.3-01 to -20
(2019 ).
205. See supra Sections II.A., B., C. See also Melanie L. Fein, Fiduciary In-
vestments in Cannabis Securities, 11–22 (2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3326205 (regarding
registration and trading of marijuana-related securities).
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one could successfully do so. The primary U.S. exchanges—
the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and Nasdaq Stock
Market (“Nasdaq”)—can reject listing applications in their dis-
cretion. For example, the NYSE listing application cautions ap-
plicants that
the Exchange has broad discretion regarding the list-
ing of any security. Thus, the Exchange may deny list-
ing or apply additional or more stringent criteria
based on any event, condition, or circumstance that
makes the listing of an Applicant Issuer’s security in-
advisable or unwarranted in the opinion of the Ex-
change. Such determination can be made even if the
Applicant Issuer meets the Exchange’s listing stan-
dards.206
There are not currently any U.S. stock exchange-listed se-
curities of Retail Marijuana Corporations with operations in
the United States.207 There are exchange-listed companies in-
corporated in Canada, where retail marijuana sales are legal
(for example, Canopy Growth, NYSE trading symbol CGC;
Cronos Group Inc., Nasdaq trading symbol CRON). There are
also companies like Tilray, which are incorporated in the
United States but conduct the bulk of their operations outside
of the United States in places where retail marijuana sales are
fully legal. Under the current circumstances, it seems unlikely
that a Retail Marijuana Corporation that sells marijuana prod-
ucts in the United States would be able to list its securities on a
U.S. exchange.208 However, it is not only companies whose se-
206. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTING APPLICATION 7, https://www
.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/Full_Application.pdf. At least one com-
pany’s listing application has been rejected: The Nasdaq rejected the listing
application of MassRoots, Inc. (“MassRoots”), a Delaware corporation that
permits users to rate and review different marijuana products. MassRoots,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Apr. 6, 2019) at 1. According to a Mass-
Roots press release, its application was denied because of the Nasdaq’s con-
cern that MassRoots is “ ‘aiding and abetting’ the distribution of an illegal
substance under Federal law[.]” MassRoots, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(May 24, 2016) at 4.
207. Fein, supra note 205, (manuscript at 12).
208. Securities of companies that are not listed on exchanges are often
traded in decentralized over-the-counter (“OTC”) markets. See Fein, supra
note 205, (manuscript at 15). There are OTC platforms that facilitate trades
between broker-dealers and their customers (customer markets) and those
for trades between dealers (interdealer markets). Over-the-Counter Market,
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curities are listed on an exchange that face potential liability
under the federal securities laws. All securities transactions—
registered or unregistered—are subject to the federal an-
tifraud provisions.209 Also, even companies whose securities
are not publicly traded may become subject to the Exchange
Act’s reporting requirements, which means they are required
to file periodic reports with the SEC, which reports may give
rise to liability in the ways contemplated below.210
b. Tilray’s Registration
Shares of Tilray began trading on the Nasdaq in July
2018.211 Tilray is incorporated in Delaware and has offices in
Seattle (and elsewhere) but is headquartered in Canada.212
Through its subsidiaries, Tilray distributes medical marijuana
in Canada, Europe, Australia, and Latin America, and grows
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/
mrotc.shtml#targetText=The%20Financial%20Industry%20Regulatory%20
Authority,traded%20in%20the%20OTC%20market. The Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) regulates U.S. broker-dealers operating in
U.S. OTC markets, but OTC markets are generally subject to less regulation
than exchanges are. Id.; see Fein, supra note 205, (manuscript at 15). They
are also less transparent and considered somewhat riskier than exchange
markets are. See J.B. Maverick, The Risks of Over-the-Counter Trading, INVES-
TOPEDIA, (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/
020515/what-are-risks-involved-otc-overthecounter-trading.asp (describing
the lack of transparency and risks of OTC market trading). MassRoots is an
example of a company whose securities trade OTC. See Investor Relations,
MASSROOTS, INC., https://ir.massroots.com/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
209. That said, not every antifraud provision applies to every securities
transaction. For example, Section 11 of the Securities Act applies only to
fraud in a registration statement. Securities Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(2018). A company without a registration statement is not in danger of vio-
lating this section.
210. See Exchange Act § 12(g)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (2018) (re-
quiring registration of securities of every issuer engaged in interstate com-
merce with total assets exceeding $10 million and a class of equity security
(other than exempted securities) held by at least either (1) two thousand
persons or (2) five hundred non-accredited investors).
211. Danya Hajjaji, Canadian Cannabis Company Tilray Soars in NASDAQ De-
but, REUTERS (July 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tilray-ipo-
debut/canadian-cannabis-company-tilray-surges-in-nasdaq-debut-
idUSKBN1K926D.
212. Tilray, Inc., Prospectus (Form S-1) (Jul. 16, 2018) at 5–6.
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medical and recreational marijuana in Canada.213 In its discus-
sion of Tilray’s business, Tilray’s prospectus states the follow-
ing (referred to herein as the “Operations Statements”):
We operate only in countries where cannabis is legal, by
which we mean the activities in those countries are
permitted under all applicable federal and state or
provincial laws. We do not produce, process or distribute
cannabis in the United States, where it remains a con-
trolled substance under U.S. federal law despite be-
ing authorized for medical and adult use by many
U.S. states.214
Among its risk factors, Tilray provides the following cau-
tions (referred to herein as the “CSA Statement”):
We are subject to a variety of laws in the United
States, Canada and elsewhere. In the United States,
despite cannabis having been legalized at the state
level for medical use in many states and for adult use
in a number of states, cannabis continues to be cate-
gorized as a Schedule I controlled substance under
the federal Controlled Substances Act, or the
CSA. . . . Our activity in the United States is limited to
certain corporate and administrative services, including ac-
counting, legal and creative services, and we do not produce
or distribute cannabis products in the United States. There-
fore, we believe that we are not subject to the CSA . . . .
Nonetheless, violations of any U.S. federal laws and
regulations, such as the CSA . . . , could result in sig-
nificant fines, penalties, administrative sanctions,
convictions or settlements arising from civil proceed-
ings initiated by either the U.S. federal government
or private citizens or criminal charges, including, but
not limited to, disgorgement of profits, cessation of
business activities or divestiture.215
Thus, in its prospectus, Tilray implicitly or explicitly states
the following: (1) Tilray legally exists and has the authority to
sell its securities in the United States; (2) Tilray does not oper-
213. Tilray, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2018) at 2. Tilray
also grows medical marijuana in Europe. Id.
214. Tilray, Inc., Prospectus (Form S-1) (Jul. 16, 2018) at 76 (emphasis
added).
215. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
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ate in the United States; (3) Tilray (and those others responsi-
ble for the registration statement) do not believe Tilray is vio-
lating the CSA; and (4) there is no material information re-
garding Tilray’s potential liability under the CSA that Tilray
has failed to disclose. This Section examines Tilray’s implicit
and explicit statements in the context of two of the federal
securities law antifraud provisions.216
2. Rule 10b-5 Liability
The “catchall” antifraud provisions under the federal se-
curities laws are Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act217 and the
accompanying Rule 10b-5.218 Section 10(b) states, in relevant
part,
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange—
. . . .
b. To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or decep-
tive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors.219
Section 10(b) is not self-executing; it calls upon the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to develop appropri-
ate rules for the prohibition’s implementation. The rule devel-
oped for this purpose, Rule 10b-5, provides
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud,
b. To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
216. For a brief summary of other federal antifraud provisions, see supra
note 194.
217. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018).
218. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
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make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
c. To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity.220
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may be enforced by the SEC
through civil actions in U.S. district courts and by the Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) through criminal prosecutions.221
There is also a judicially implied private cause of action for
investors who have been harmed by fraud actionable under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.222
Defendants under Rule 10b-5 include any persons who
commit the relevant fraudulent acts. A director can be held
liable if the director “makes” the misstatement or omission
and/or “controls” the corporation. Under Rule 10b-5, “the
maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate au-
thority over the statement, including its content and whether
and how to communicate it.”223 Moreover, under Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act,
[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls
any person liable under any provision of this chapter
or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same ex-
tent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the
controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constitut-
ing the violation or cause of action.224
220. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2018) (granting the SEC authority to bring
actions in U.S. district courts to enjoin violations of the securities laws and to
seek monetary penalties therefore and authorizing the SEC to transmit evi-
dence to the attorney general to pursue criminal proceedings).
222. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
(1971); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983).
223. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142
(2011).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2018).
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Under Exchange Act Regulation C, “control” means “the
possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause
the direction of the management and policies of a person,
whether through the ownership of voting securities, by con-
tract, or otherwise.”225 Directors are not automatically control
persons,226 though they may be deemed control persons if
they exercise the requisite control.227 Outside directors who
are not involved in the business are unlikely to be found to be
control persons.228
a. Cause of Action
The Supreme Court has defined six elements in a private
Rule 10b-5 claim involving publicly traded securities:229
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission);
(2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind;
(3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a secur-
ity;
(4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving pub-
lic securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as
“transaction causation”;
(5) economic loss; and
(6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection between
the material misrepresentation and the loss.230
In SEC regulatory actions, there is generally no need to
prove reliance, economic loss, or loss causation, other than to
the extent necessary to establish the extent of a defendant’s
profits for disgorgement purposes.231 The same is true for DOJ
prosecutions, unless the DOJ seeks to require the defendant to
225. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2015).
226. Arthur Children’s Tr. v. Keim, 994 F.2d 1390, 1396 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“A director is not automatically liable as a controlling person.”).
227. Id. at 1397.
228. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1984).
229. Though much of the discussion in this Section focuses on private
claims involving publicly traded securities, it is important to note that Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to all securities transactions, not only to
publicly traded securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018) (subjecting both
“any security registered on a national exchange” and “any security not so regis-
tered” to antifraud liability) (emphasis added).
230. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (citations
and emphasis omitted).
231. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
2(b)(1)–(2) (2018); SEC v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (9th
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pay restitution.232 Thus, the “core” elements of a Rule 10b-5
claim are (1) “manipulation or deception (including by the
misrepresentation of, or omission to state, a material fact)”;
(2) “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security”; (3)
“with scienter.”233 This Section briefly describes each of these
core elements in turn.234
i. Manipulation or Deception
Although Section 10(b) proscribes the use of manipula-
tion or deception, it does not define either term. Nor are
there definitions in the Exchange Act or in any SEC rule or
regulation under Section 10(b).235 This has left the task of de-
fining these statutory terms to the federal courts.236 The Su-
preme Court has viewed the term “manipulative” as “virtually a
term of art when used in connection with securities markets,”
commenting that “[i]t connotes intentional or willful conduct
designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or arti-
ficially affecting the price of securities.”237 Rule 10b-5 encom-
passes a variety of different types of manipulative or deceptive
conduct that could be the basis of liability under Section 10(b)
Cir. 1993) (noting there is no need for the SEC to prove reliance); Buell,
supra note 194, at 546.
232. Buell, supra note 194, at 547.
233. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved! Insider Violations of
Rule 10b-5 for Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 MD. L. REV. 380,
383 (2006).
234. Regarding the additional elements, see, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994) (reli-
ance); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir.
1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (loss
causation); Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 338 (damages/economic loss). There
are also standing requirements for plaintiffs in private actions. Only actual
purchasers and sellers of securities, not those who opted not to purchase or
sell securities because of the manipulation or deception in question, have
standing to bring suit. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
731–34 (1975). There are additional substantive and procedural require-
ments applicable to Rule 10b-5 class actions. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 21D, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018) (additional requirements for private
class actions).
235. See Heminway, supra note 233, at 384.
236. See id. at 384–85.
237. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
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but does not provide greater clarity on the statutory terms’ def-
initions.238
The primary path to liability under Rule 10b-5 and Sec-
tion 10(b)—making “any untrue statement of a material fact
or . . . omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading”239—raises the
question of what constitutes materiality. In Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, the Supreme Court adopted a materiality standard for Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5240 that it had previously applied in
the proxy solicitation context under Section 14(a) of the Ex-
change Act241: a misstatement or omission is material “if there
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.”242 Stated dif-
ferently, an omission is material if there is “a substantial likeli-
hood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly al-
tered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”243 Fur-
ther, “with respect to contingent or speculative information or
events, . . . materiality ‘will depend at any given time upon a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of
238. See Heminway, supra note 233, at 384.
239. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
240. 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2018).
242. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). The Basic Court noted that there was no dispute that
the Section 14(a) materiality standard applies to Section 10 as well. Id. at 232
n.8. Basic does not expressly apply this standard to a misstatement, as the
facts before it concerned an omission. See id. at 231. However, this material-
ity standard has since been used to analyze the materiality of both misstate-
ments and omissions. See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 233, at 386 (discussing
the Basic standard as applicable to both misstatements and omissions).
243. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449). Both
the TSC Industries and Basic Courts present these two standards as mere re-
statements, or further explanations, of each other, though they have also
been described as alternatives. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 (describing the
second standard as the first one “[p]ut another way”); Basic, 485 U.S. at
231–32 (describing the second formulation as a further explanation of the
first one); Heminway, supra note 233, at 386 (describing the two as “alterna-
tive standards”).
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the totality of the company activity.’”244 Materiality is “a mixed
question of law and fact”245 and necessarily involves a “fact-
specific inquiry.”246
Statements of directors’ opinions or beliefs can also be
material because investors deem them important.247 Directors
face potential liability for statements of opinion or belief if the
opinions are about matters that are objectively verifiable and
the plaintiff can prove the statements were knowingly false.248
For example, if a director stated, “I think we’re having a great
quarter” and the plaintiff can show that the company was actu-
ally having a bad quarter, the director could face liability for
making a statement of belief about an objective fact in circum-
stances in which the belief could not be supported. On the
other hand, merely having an “unclean heart” is insufficient
for liability; the plaintiff must prove more than that the direc-
tor did not actually hold the stated belief.249
The second path to liability under Rule 10b-5 and Section
10(b) comes under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c). Courts have referred
to these claims as “scheme liability.”250 Scheme liability focuses
not on deceptive statements, but on deceptive conduct.251 Be-
cause the Supreme Court has rejected a theory of aiding and
abetting liability for private Rule 10b-5 actions,252 a finding of
scheme liability requires “an inherently deceptive act that is
244. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)).
245. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000).
246. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 240.
247. See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090–91 (1991).
248. See id. at 1095 (construing Section 14(a)).
249. See id. at 1096 (quotation omitted).
250. See, e.g., Pub. Pension Fund Grp. v. KV Pharm. Co., 679 F.3d 972, 987
(8th Cir. 2012); In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 643 n.29 (3d Cir.
2011), abrogated on other grounds by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trs.
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown, LLP,
603 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2010); Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d
931, 938 (9th Cir. 2009). But see Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1102 (2019)
(noting the “considerable overlap among the subsections” of Rule 10b-5 and
commenting that the subsections are not “mutually exclusive”).
251. E.g., In re DVI, 639 F.3d at 643 n.29 (“We refer to claims under Rule
10b-5(a) and (c) as ‘scheme liability claims’ because they make deceptive
conduct actionable, as opposed to Rule 10b-5(b), which relates to deceptive
statements.”).
252. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
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distinct from an alleged misstatement,” such as purposefully
manipulating stock prices.253 However, in a decision that
found scheme liability through dissemination of materially
misleading information via email, the Supreme Court recently
opened the door to recognizing scheme liability in connection
with making a misrepresentation or omission.254
ii. “In Connection with” Requirement
The second core element of a Rule 10b-5 claim, the “in
connection with” requirement, is construed broadly.255 Privity
is not required in Rule 10b-5 actions.256 The Supreme Court
has found the “in connection with” requirement satisfied
when the “securities transactions and breaches of fiduciary
duty coincide[d]”257 and when an investor “suffered an injury
as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities
as an investor.”258 Lower courts have found sufficient connec-
tion where the misstatement “occurs in a medium calculated
1995 makes clear that the SEC may bring aiding and abetting allegations in
its Rule 10b-5 suits. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
253. Fogel v. Vega, 759 F. App’x 18, 25 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting SEC v.
Kelly, 817 F.Supp.2d 340, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)); see also Pub. Pension Fund
Grp., 679 F.3d at 987 (“We join the Second and Ninth Circuits in recogniz-
ing a scheme liability claim must be based on conduct beyond misrepresen-
tations or omissions actionable under Rule 10b-5(b).”). Some examples of
conduct giving rise to scheme liability include engaging in trading that
manipulated stock prices by creating an appearance of an active market for
those shares, see SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998),
and defrauding customers into buying securities with unreasonable price
markups. See SEC v. First Jersey Sec. Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471–72 (2d Cir.
1996). In another case of scheme liability involving a “u-turning” scheme,
one broker sent his commodity price to another brokerage house; the sec-
ond broker in turn sent the same price back to the first brokerage house and
represented it as an independent quote. SEC v. Lee, 720 F. Supp. 2d 305,
334 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
254. See Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1103–04.
255. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Softpoint, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 846, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
256. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997) (finding the
“in connection with” element satisfied when the “transaction and the breach
of duty coincide, even though the person or entity defrauded is not the
other party to the trade”).
257. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 825 (2002).
258. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 13–14.
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to reach investors.”259 Courts construing the “in connection
with” element have not required the misstatement or omission
to concern a security’s value:
[T]he fraud in question must relate to the nature of
the securities, the risks associated with their purchase
or sale, or some other factor with similar connection
to the securities themselves. While the fraud in ques-
tion need not relate to the investment value of the
securities themselves, it must have more than some
tangential relation to the securities transaction.260
Given the rather nebulous interpretations of the “in con-
nection with” requirement,261 a broad array of deception can
potentially satisfy this element.
iii. Scienter
The third core element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is state of
mind. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held
that a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must prove “scienter”—“a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”262
The Court then also recognized that “[i]n certain areas of the
law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional con-
duct for purposes of imposing liability for some act” and re-
served the question of whether recklessness would suffice for
Rule 10b-5 liability.263 The federal circuit courts have since ac-
cepted recklessness as sufficient for Rule 10b-5 scienter.264
Since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
259. Heminway, supra note 233, at 387 (first citing Semerenko v. Cendant
Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2000); then citing SEC v. Rana Research,
Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1993); then citing In re Ames Dep’t Stores
Inc. Stock Litig., 991 F.2d 953, 965 (2d Cir. 1993); and then citing In re
Leslie Fay Co. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
260. Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th
Cir. 1999); see also Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12; Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822.
261. See Thomas J. Molony, Making a Solid Connection: A New Look at Rule
10b-5’s Transactional Nexus Requirement, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 767, 768–69
(2013) (describing the difficulty in applying the “in connection with” ele-
ment).
262. 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (11th Cir.
2001); In re Phillips Petrol. Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989);
Buell, supra note 194, at 549 (“[T]he federal appellate courts have uniformly
held that recklessness can establish scienter under Rule 10b-5.”).
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Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),265 class action plaintiffs are required
to plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence”266 of scienter, one that a reasonable person would deem
“cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference
one could draw from the facts alleged.”267 And yet, this height-
ened pleading standard has not changed the substantive defi-
nition of scienter.268 As a result, a private plaintiff may allege
that defendants acted with intent to deceive, or
may sue for merely reckless conduct of the super-neg-
ligence variety. That is, a plaintiff could seek damages
under Rule 10b-5 on the ground that an actor issued
a factually untrue material statement, was unaware of
the untruth, and was unaware due to such extreme
carelessness that she should have known that the rep-
resentation was not true.269
The standards for scienter in actions brought by the SEC
and DOJ are extremely murky.270 The SEC’s complaints fre-
quently invoke both Rule 10b-5 and also Section 17, which
uses a negligence standard in part,271 and so it is unclear
whether the SEC is alleging knowing, reckless, or even careless
misrepresentations or omissions by the defendants.272 There is
even less guidance for criminal actions.273 Though Section 24
of the Securities Act and Section 32 of the Exchange Act
threaten fines and imprisonment for someone who “willfully”
violates a provision of the Acts,274 Section 32 of the Exchange
Act further states that a defendant may not be imprisoned if
265. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
and 18 U.S.C.).
266. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2)(A) (2018).
267. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)
(footnote omitted).
268. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199–201 (1st Cir.
1999) (“[T]he PSLRA did not address the substantive definition of scien-
ter.”).
269. Buell, supra note 194, at 551 (footnote omitted).
270. See id. at 553–60.
271. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
272. See Buell, supra note 194, at 554.
273. See id. at 555.
274. Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2018); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2018).
2020] HIGH CRIMES 481
the defendant proves he did not have knowledge of the rule
he is charged with having violated.275 This statutory conflict
has confused the federal courts.276 The Supreme Court has
not clarified the scienter standard for criminal prosecutions,
and the federal courts have a wide variety of inconsistent stan-
dards.277 Thus, the precise scienter standards in federal ac-
tions remain unclear.
iv. In Pari Delicto Defense
There are some defenses available to Rule 10b-5 defend-
ants. Much like state law fiduciary duty claims, claims brought
under Rule 10b-5 may be subject to the in pari delicto de-
fense.278 Courts have held that the in pari delicto defense may
be asserted by defendants in private Rule 10b-5 actions.279
However, the defense is a limited one. Courts have declined to
permit the defense when it would contravene the enforcement
purpose of the federal securities laws.280 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has limited the defense
only [to] where (1) as a direct result of his own ac-
tions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal re-
sponsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and
(2) preclusion of suit would not significantly inter-
fere with the effective enforcement of the securities
laws and protection of the investing public.281
v. Bespeaks Caution Doctrine/Forward Looking Statement
Defense
A second defense to a Rule 10b-5 claim is the common
law bespeaks caution doctrine, which was incorporated in part
into the PSLRA reforms. The bespeaks caution doctrine ren-
275. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
276. See Buell, supra note 194, at 556.
277. See id. at 556–58 (collecting standards and citing cases).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 134–138 for a discussion of the in
pari delicto defense.
279. E.g., Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969);
Hogan v. Teledyne, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
280. E.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,
310–11 (1985) (denying use of in pari delicto defense against plaintiff inves-
tors who were induced to purchase securities based upon fraudulent state-
ments they believed to be valuable inside information).
281. Id. at 310–11.
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ders “alleged misstatements or omissions . . . immaterial as a
matter of law if accompanied by sufficient cautionary state-
ments.”282 This doctrine applies to predictions, opinions, and
other forms of soft, “forward-looking” statements contained in
a company’s communications:283
[W]hen an offering document’s forecasts, opinions
or projections are accompanied by meaningful cau-
tionary statements, the forward-looking statements
will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if
those statements did not affect the “total mix” of in-
formation the document provided investors. In other
words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the
alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial
as a matter of law.284
The doctrine recognizes the tension between investors’
desire for corporate managers to share their forecasts and pre-
dictions about the companies’ future operations and the un-
derstandable hesitation managers would have about doing so
if they faced liability for guessing wrong. Notably, the bespeaks
caution doctrine only applies to forward-looking statements;
courts have held that it cannot shield misrepresentations of
present or historical facts.285
The PSLRA added in Section 21E of the Exchange Act a
safe harbor for covered persons, including directors,286 in pri-
vate fraud actions for written or oral forward-looking state-
ments that are “identified as a forward-looking statement, and
. . . [are] accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward looking state-
ment[,] . . .” or if the plaintiff fails to prove that the statement
282. Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 548 (8th Cir. 1997).
283. In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368 (3d Cir.
1993).
284. Id. at 371.
285. See, e.g., EP Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 874 (3d
Cir. 2000); P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.
2004).
286. Covered persons include Exchange Act reporting issuers and persons
acting on their behalf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(a)(1), (2), 15
U.S.C. § 78u–5(a)(1), (2) (1995). A “person acting on behalf of an issuer”
includes “any officer, director, or employee of such issuer.” § 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u–5(i)(4).
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was made with actual knowledge that it was false or mislead-
ing.287 A “forward-looking statement” is defined to include a
variety of financial projections, plans for future operations,
predictions of future economic performance, assumptions un-
derlying these projections, plans, and predictions, and other
similar statements.288 Thus, there is no liability in private class
actions for misstatements or omissions that constitute forward-
looking statements and are accompanied by appropriate cau-
tionary language. Regarding what constitutes appropriate cau-
tionary language, “it is enough to point to the principal con-
tingencies that could cause actual results to depart from the
projection.”289
The Section 21E safe harbor is limited. Likely the be-
speaks caution doctrine, it applies only to forward-looking in-
formation, not to present or historical facts. Also, it does not
apply to forward-looking statements made in connection with
a tender offer or an initial public offering.290 Protections in
connection with the initial registration and sale of Retail Mari-
juana Corporations’ securities might be the most important,
since the retail marijuana industry is in its nascent stage, and
the statutory safe harbor would not guard those.
b. Application to Directors of Retail Marijuana
Corporations
There are at least two avenues that a plaintiff investor
could pursue under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against a
Retail Marijuana Corporation and its directors. The first has to
do with the corporation’s291 legal existence. In offering its se-
curities for sale, a Retail Marijuana Corporation represents
that it is authorized to exist and to offer and issue those securi-
287. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c)(A)(i), (B), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u–5(c)(A)(i), (B) (1995). There is a complementary provision in Sec-
tion 27A of the Securities Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27A, 15
U.S.C. § 77z–2 (2018).
288. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(i)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–5(i)(1)
(1995).
289. Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2004).
290. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(b)(2)(C), (D), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u–5(i)(1)(b)(2)(C), (D) (1995).
291. Throughout this discussion I use the term “corporation” and not “pu-
tative corporation,” or “association,” or any similar term that could prove
distracting. Nonetheless, because of the illegal purpose doctrine, see supra
Section I.D., the more distracting language is also more legally accurate.
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ties. These representations may be explicit, such as those a cor-
poration makes in a typical stock purchase agreement in which
it represents its due authorization and authority to enter into
the transaction.292 They may also be implicit, as when a direc-
tor tries to drum up investment interest by touting the corpo-
ration’s financial vitality and long-term prospects in a meeting
with prospective investors.
Tilray’s public offer and sale of its securities entailed both
explicit and implicit representations that Tilray is a validly ex-
isting corporation that was authorized to sell its securities. For
instance, Tilray’s prospectus states, “We are a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of the State of Delaware.”293 It reports
having “authorized capital stock,”294 including “two classes of
authorized common stock,”295 nine million shares of which
were available for purchase in the initial public offering.296
Tilray’s amended and restated certificate of incorporation was
attached as an exhibit to its registration statement.297 Taken as
a whole, Tilray’s registration statement gives every impression
that Tilray is a validly existing corporation under Delaware law
and was selling authorized shares in compliance with the se-
curities laws.
In fact, as discussed above, like any other Retail Marijuana
Corporation, Tilray arguably does not exist, as the illegal pur-
pose doctrine bars formation of a corporation formed for the
illegal purpose of selling retail marijuana.298 A corporation
292. For example, a stock purchase agreement entered into by a corpora-
tion may contain language to the following effect: “Seller is a corporation
duly organized, validly existing and in good standing under the Laws of the
state of [STATE OF ORGANIZATION]. Seller has full corporate power and
authority to enter into this Agreement . . . , to carry out its obligations here-
under . . . and to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby . . . .”
ANDREW N. DAVIS & AARON D. LEVY, PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & SECURI-
TIES, STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (PRO-BUYER LONG FORM), Practical Law
Standard Document 4-382-9882 (2019), Westlaw.
293. Tilray, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Registration Statement (Form S-1)
at 119 (July 16, 2018).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 8.
296. Id.
297. Id. at exhibit 3.3.
298. This is true even though Tilray has received a certificate of incorpora-
tion from the state of Delaware, and despite the fact that Tilray’s stated pur-
pose is “to engage in any lawful act or activity for which a corporation may be
organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.” Id.
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that does not exist is not authorized to sell its securities. To
issue securities of a non-existent entity defrauds Tilray’s inves-
tors, who have relied upon Tilray’s representations that it is
duly incorporated and has the capacity to issue securities.299 In
other words, Tilray’s representations as to its existence and au-
thority to issue securities are misrepresentations of fact, and
therefore are potentially actionable under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Moreover, Tilray’s engaging in the retail mari-
juana business—and soliciting investments in order to do so—
falls squarely within the type of conduct that amounts to a
“course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person”300 and gives rise to potential
scheme liability. As the Supreme Court has held, “using false
representations to induce the purchase of securities would
seem a paradigmatic example of securities fraud.”301
See supra Section I.D. Though Delaware’s corporation statute recognizes a
corporation’s legal existence upon filing, execution, and acknowledgment
of the certificate of incorporation with the secretary of state, it also contem-
plates involuntary dissolution and forfeiture of a corporation’s charter by
court order. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §106 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8,
§ 285 (2019). The statute also preserves the right of the courts to inquire
“into the regularity or validity of the organization of a corporation, or its
lawful possession of any corporate power it may assert” when a corporation’s
existence is challenged. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 329(b) (2019). Given the
shifting state of marijuana law and the unintended consequences that state
legalization has produced, it is possible that creative plaintiffs may success-
fully challenge such Retail Marijuana Corporations’ legal existence in the
future.
299. Though a discussion of common law fraud is beyond the scope of this
Article, note that this representation could also give rise to liability for com-
mon law fraud. At common law, “[w]henever . . . an issuer or underwriter
of securities offers them for sale to the public, he impliedly represents that
the applicable provisions of law have been complied with. The falsity of that
representation may give rise to an action either for breach of warranty or for
fraud depending upon the culpability of the seller in the particular transac-
tion. . . . The obligation of a warranty is absolute, and is imposed as a matter
of law irrespective of whether the seller knew or should have known of the
falsity of his representations. Fraud, on the other hand, involves the addi-
tional requirement that the seller knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, that his representations were false.” Mary Pick-
ford Co. v. Bayly Bros., 86 P.2d 102, 111 (Cal. 1939).
300. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2019).
301. Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1097 (2019). The situation is analo-
gous to the concept of “false pretenses,” a term used in the federal Bank-
ruptcy Code. Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a non-
dischargeable debt for money obtained through “false pretenses, a false rep-
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A representation that Tilray exists and is authorized to is-
sue securities is certainly also material for Rule 10b-5 purposes.
Tilray’s legal existence is clearly fundamental to an investor’s
legitimate investment expectations. If the State of Delaware
later decides that Tilray does not exist and revokes its charter,
Tilray’s shareholders will see their investments evaporate.
Thus, there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable inves-
tor would consider the facts of Tilray’s existence and authority
to issue securities important in making investment decisions,
and Tilray’s lack of existence and authority would certainly al-
ter the total mix of information about Tilray.
The second basis for Rule 10b-5 liability is the statements
(or omissions) a Retail Marijuana Corporation makes about its
compliance with the laws surrounding marijuana sales.302 For
example, the CSA Statement—“We believe that we are not sub-
ject to the CSA . . .”303—appears in the “Risk Factors” section
of Tilray’s registration statement. If a court later determines
that Tilray is subject to the CSA, a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff might
pounce upon the CSA Statement and claim that this was a ma-
terial misrepresentation. While courts have held that
“[g]eneral statements about honesty and integrity, including
those about general compliance with the law” may be “immate-
rial puffery” and insufficiently specific to base a Rule 10b-5
claim upon,304 a specific claim that Tilray is in compliance
with (or not subject to) the CSA could still be material and
resentation, or actual fraud[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2018). False pre-
tenses refers to “a series of events, activities or communications which, when
considered collectively, create a false and misleading set of circumstances, or
false and misleading understanding of a transaction, in which a creditor is
wrongfully induced by the debtor to transfer property or extend credit to
the debtor.” ColeMichael Invs. v. Burke, 405 B.R. 626, 645 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2009). Though this is a bankruptcy statute provision, not a securities statute
provision, the import is similar: the Retail Marijuana Corporation is induc-
ing the investor to invest under the false pretense that the corporation exists
and is authorized to issue securities.
302. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2019). Of course, any other misstate-
ment or omission by a Retail Marijuana Corporation would be actionable as
well. This analysis focuses on a specific statement made by Tilray because it
exemplifies the type of statement that a Retail Marijuana Corporation is
likely to make given the nature of its business.
303. Tilray, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 24 (June 20, 2018).
304. E.g., Fogel v. Vega, 759 F.App’x 18, 23-24 (2d Cir. 2018).
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therefore actionable—though, as addressed later in this analy-
sis, it is unlikely to be a successful claim.
Assuming a court finds at least one of these theories an
actionable misrepresentation or deception, the question arises
whether Tilray’s directors are proper defendants. If the board
of directors approves a contract or securities filing, then the
board collectively has ultimate authority over the corporation’s
statement and, thus, “makes” the statement.305 That said, indi-
vidual directors cannot unilaterally effect board actions, so no
individual Tilray director is necessarily the maker of Tilray’s
statements. Further, directors are not automatic control per-
sons306 so any finding that a Tilray director “controls” Tilray
would have to be a fact-specific one. Another possibility,
though again a fact-specific one, would be charging a Tilray
board member who disseminates misinformation with liability
under a scheme liability theory.307 In any case, a plaintiff is
more likely to successfully bring claims against Tilray directors
who are also members of management, as they are more likely
to exert control over the corporation and to be involved in
touting the company’s investment prospects.
Under either of the deception theories, satisfying the “in
connection with” requirement will not be difficult. Encourag-
ing investment is a paradigmatic example of conduct “in con-
nection with” a securities transaction. Similarly, statements
contained in a prospectus or registration statement are clearly
within the scope of what Rule 10b-5 covers. A plaintiff should
have no trouble establishing this element of a Rule 10b-5 case
against Tilray’s directors.
Scienter presents a thornier question. It would be difficult
to establish that a Tilray director knew, or was reckless in not
knowing, that Tilray does not legally exist—especially since
Tilray has received a stamped copy of its certificate of incorpo-
ration from the Delaware secretary of state. It does not appear
that anyone on Tilray’s board is a lawyer.308 Even a director
305. See Securities Act Form S-1 (requiring that a majority of the board of
directors sign the registration statement).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 224–28.
307. See Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1102–03 (holding an investment banker who
disseminated false information via email with approval of his boss liable
under Rule 10b-5 as a primary violator under a scheme liability theory).
308. See Board of Directors, TILRAY, INC., https://www.tilray.com/
boardofdirectors (last visited Aug. 13, 2019).
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with a legal degree probably would not be charged with knowl-
edge that the illegal purpose doctrine renders Tilray (and all
other Retail Marijuana Corporations) non-existent. The fact
that Tilray is incorporated in a state in which retail marijuana
has not been legalized makes the constructive knowledge argu-
ment somewhat stronger, but it is still likely that a court would
not find the requisite scienter.
The same is likely true for the scienter surrounding the
CSA Statement. Certainly, a Tilray director would be chargea-
ble with knowledge that selling retail marijuana is illegal under
the CSA. The more important question is whether it is appro-
priate to find that a director had the requisite intent to deceive
when that director approved the language stating that Tilray
does not believe it is subject to the CSA. Recall that, under the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, for an opinion to be actiona-
ble under Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must prove that the opinion
is about something that is objectively verifiable and the state-
ment was knowingly false.309 Whether Tilray is subject to the
CSA is objectively verifiable, so a plaintiff can likely leap that
hurdle. The much more difficult part would be proving that
the CSA Statement was knowingly false. The plaintiff would
have to show more than that a Tilray director privately held
doubts about Tilray’s being subject to the CSA; the director
would have to know—or at least have a strong reason to be-
lieve—that Tilray actually is subject to the CSA. This might be
possible if there were a “smoking gun” of board minutes re-
counting how Tilray’s legal team explained to the board that
Tilray is subject to the CSA. Records that reflect the oppo-
site—e.g., minutes of a meeting in which Tilray’s lawyers
briefed the board on the CSA and advised the board that
Tilray does not fall under it—would severely undermine the
plaintiff’s ability to establish scienter.
Even if a private Rule 10b-5 plaintiff can establish these
“core” elements in a case against Tilray’s directors, as well as
reliance, economic loss, and loss causation, the directors can
attempt to bring one of the available defenses. Because the
bespeaks caution doctrine and forward-looking statement safe
harbors are limited to forward-looking statements, the more
relevant defense for purposes of this analysis is the in pari
delicto defense. In short, a defendant director would need to
309. See supra text accompanying notes 247–249.
2020] HIGH CRIMES 489
argue that a Tilray investor was equally at fault for seeking to
invest in an enterprise that is unlawful under federal law, so
the courts should not intervene.
This defense seems unlikely to prevail. If it is difficult to
establish that a Retail Marijuana Corporation director had the
requisite scienter to defraud investors regarding the state of
the enterprise’s legal existence, it is significantly more chal-
lenging to prove that a plaintiff-investor knew that the corpo-
ration did not exist and invested anyway. Except in the very
unlikely case that a plaintiff has particular knowledge about
business entity law and the interplay between it and marijuana
legalization, it is extremely hard to believe that a court would
invoke the in pari delicto defense against a retail marijuana in-
vestor on this theory. Similarly, a court would be highly un-
likely to find that a plaintiff “knew” Tilray was subject to the
CSA, and so should be barred from bringing an action on the
basis of the CSA Statement. The in pari delicto is more limited
defense than that, and is unlikely to be availing to directors of
Retail Marijuana Corporations such as Tilray.310
1. Section 11 Liability
A second significant federal antifraud provision is Section
11(a) of the Securities Act. Section 11(a) provides, in relevant
part, the following:
In case any part of the registration statement, when
such part became effective, contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a ma-
terial fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading, any
person acquiring such security (unless it is proved
that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such
untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity,
in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—
. . . .
2. every person who was a director of (or person per-
forming similar functions) or partner in the issuer at
310. However, it is not an entirely toothless defense. A court could con-
ceivably sustain the defense under different circumstances, such as if an in-
vestor sought to invest in a Retail Marijuana Corporation that planned to
open retail stores in South Carolina, with full knowledge that South Carolina
has not legalized retail marijuana sales.
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the time of the filing of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is as-
serted[.]311
In other words, this section imposes strict civil liability in
suits brought by purchasers of registered securities upon issu-
ers and their directors (and other statutory defendants) for
fraud in the registration statement.
a. Cause of Action
The allure of Section 11 for purchaser-plaintiffs is that
there are fewer elements to the cause of action than there are
in suits under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Plaintiffs must
prove there was a material misstatement or omission in the re-
gistration statement at the time that portion of the registration
statement became effective. A registration statement will vio-
late Section 11 “if it does not disclose ‘material objective fac-
tual matters,’ or buries those matters beneath other informa-
tion, or treats them cavalierly.”312 The standard for materiality
under Section 11 is the same as under Section 10(b).313 Courts
have also applied the bespeaks caution doctrine to Section 11
claims.314
To have standing, plaintiffs—even those who purchased
on the secondary market—must also “trace” the specific shares
they purchased to the public offering under the allegedly de-
fective registration statement.315 Unlike under Section 10(b),
there is no need to prove scienter, reliance, or causation.316
311. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2) (2019).
312. Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Tr., Inc., 98 F.3d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d
759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991)).
313. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 178 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004).
314. E.g., id. at 173 (applying the bespeaks caution doctrine and the
PSLRA safe harbor in a Section 11 claim); see supra text accompanying notes
282–285 regarding the bespeaks caution doctrine.
315. E.g., In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2013) (citing Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191 F.3d 1076, 1080
(9th Cir. 1999); Lee v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 294 F.3d 969, 978 (8th Cir.
2002)); Kirkwood v. Taylor, 590 F. Supp. 1375, 1377–78 (D. Minn. 1984),
judgment aff’d, 760 F.2d 272 (8th Cir. 1985).
316. However, if the plaintiff acquires the security after the issuer publicly
releases an earning statement that covers at least twelve months beginning
after the registration statement’s effective date, then the plaintiff must prove
reliance upon the false statement in the registration statement or upon the
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Statutory damages equal the difference between the plaintiff’s
purchase price (not exceeding the offering price) and the
value of the shares at the time the suit was filed if the plaintiff
still owns the shares, with derivations if the plaintiff sold the
shares prior to filing suit or after filing but before judg-
ment.317 Outside directors face proportionate liability; they
are liable for the portion of the judgment that corresponds to
their share of the fault.318
There are several defenses to Section 11 liability. First, the
defendant-director can prove that the purchaser-plaintiff had
actual knowledge of the false statement or omitted fact.319
This defense is not particularly useful, given that it is ex-
tremely difficult to prove what an individual plaintiff knew at
the time of a securities purchase, especially since it is unlikely
that a defendant-director had any personal connection to the
plaintiff. Securities class actions only magnify the problem.
This defense is largely useful after the fraud is publicly cor-
rected so that the market (and therefore the individual plain-
tiff) “knows” the information.
The second line of defense protects defendants who rea-
sonably and actually believed that the registration statement
was not fraudulent. Non-expert defendants (i.e., defendants
who did not prepare professional reports or valuations for in-
clusion in the registration statement) can avoid liability with
respect to statements or omissions in a “non-expertised” por-
tion of the registration statement (i.e., part of the registration
statement not purportedly made by an expert) if they
had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe, at the time such
part of the registration statement became effective,
that the statements therein were true and that there
was no omission to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading[.] . . . (due diligence de-
fense).320
registration statement without knowledge of the omission. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(a).
317. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e).
318. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f)(2)(A); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(f)(2)(B)(i) (2019).
319. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
320. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A).
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There is a slightly lower bar for non-experts’ due dili-
gence defense for statements in an “expertised” portion of the
registration statement; in this case, non-expert defendants
avoid liability if they
had no reasonable ground to believe and did not be-
lieve, at the time such part of the registration state-
ment became effective, that the statements therein
were untrue or that there was an omission to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or neces-
sary to make the statements therein not misleading,
or that such part of the registration statement did not
fairly represent the statement of the expert or was
not a fair copy of or extract from the report or valua-
tion of the expert . . .321
Thus, non-experts must demonstrate reasonable investiga-
tion, reasonable grounds to believe, and actual belief that the
non-expertised portion of the registration statement was truth-
ful.322 They must show only that they had no reasonable
grounds to believe, and no actual belief, that the expertised
portion of the registration statement was untruthful. The stan-
dard of reasonableness is “that required of a prudent man in
the management of his own property.”323 This due diligence
defense is rather onerous,324 particularly for inside directors,
who are generally chargeable with knowledge of all the rele-
321. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C).
322. Under Rule 176 of the Securities Act, factors that are relevant to de-
termining whether the defendant conducted a reasonable investigation or
had a reasonable ground for belief under Section 11(c) include, among
others, the type of issuer, the defendant’s relationship to the issuer, and
“[r]easonable reliance on officers, employees, and others whose duties
should have given them knowledge of the particular facts[.]” 17 C.F.R
§ 230.176 (2019).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c).
324. Courts have sustained the due diligence defense when outside direc-
tors have undertaken a careful review of the allegedly defective document
and have reasonably relied upon representations by management and the
corporation’s independent investment and accounting firms. E.g., Laven v.
Flanagan, 695 F. Supp. 800, 810–11 (D.N.J. 1988). Outside directors have
failed to establish due diligence when they were not sufficiently familiar with
the corporation’s affairs, when they relied upon management and failed to
uncover errors that could have been detected through reasonable investiga-
tion, and when they were so familiar with a potential transaction that they
could not have reasonable grounds to believe misstatements about that
transaction were true. E.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
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vant material facts of about the business and its operations.325
Directors may rely on others only to the extent the reliance is
reasonable. They cannot rely upon others when their own in-
dependent investigation would uncover the errors in ques-
tion.326
The third line of defense is for whistleblower defendants
who took measures to distance themselves from the fraudulent
registration statement, including resigning from office and al-
erting the SEC that they would not be responsible for the
fraudulent portion of the registration statement.327 Obviously,
the whistleblower defense is available only to a narrow class of
defendants in narrow circumstances.
Finally, there is a “negative causation” defense—that is,
defendants can prove that some or all of plaintiff’s damages
are attributable to something other than the false statement or
omission in the registration statement.328 The plaintiff’s dam-
ages will be reduced to the extent that they are proved not to
have been caused by the fraudulent registration statement.329
643, 687–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Kitchens v. U.S. Shelter, 1988 WL 108598, at
*37 (D.S.C. June 30, 1988).
325. See, e.g., BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 684–85 (finding the inside directors
knew all the relevant information about the company’s business and could
not have believed that the registration statement was truthful); Kitchens, 1988
WL 108598, at *37 (similar). Inside directors have also failed to sustain their
due diligence defense when they unreasonably relied upon preliminary esti-
mates of a target company’s financial information. Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 578–79 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); see also
id. at 578 (“Inside directors with intimate knowledge of corporate affairs and
of the particular transactions will be expected to make a more complete in-
vestigation and have more extensive knowledge of facts supporting or con-
tradicting inclusions in the registration statements than outside directors.”).
326. See, e.g., Laven, 695 F. Supp. at 811 (“In pursuing such a[ ] [reasona-
ble] investigation, a director may reasonably rely upon the representations
of his subordinates.”); BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 690 (“To require an audit
would obviously be unreasonable. On the other hand, to require a check of
matters easily verifiable is not unreasonable.”).
327. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b)(1)–(2).
328. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). This section provides “if the defendant proves
that any portion or all of such damages represents other than the deprecia-
tion in value of such security resulting from such part of the registration
statement, with respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or
omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of or all such
damages shall not be recoverable.” Id.
329. Id.
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Notably, the focus is not on whether the misstatement or omis-
sion induced the plaintiff to make the purchase; it is instead
on whether the fraud caused the decline in the securities’
value.330 Defendants can demonstrate that the diminution in
value was caused by other factors affecting the market as a
whole, such as a broad decline in the stock market as a
whole.331
b. Application to Directors of Retail Marijuana
Corporations
Assuming the plaintiff has standing, Section 11 is a poten-
tial source of liability for directors of publicly traded Retail Ma-
rijuana Corporations like Tilray. As noted above, directors are
statutory defendants under Section 11(a)(2). Thus, the crux
of the plaintiff’s case is proving that there was a material mis-
statement or omission in the registration statement. Though
this will necessarily be a fact-intensive and company-specific
analysis, Retail Marijuana Corporations are perhaps particu-
larly susceptible to Section 11 claims because of the conflicted
state of marijuana legalization. In other words, Retail Mari-
juana Corporations might prove attractive targets for ag-
grieved investors because marijuana’s illegality under federal
law leaves open potential avenues for suit. The following dis-
cussion describes how a Tilray investor might attempt to
mount a Section 11 case on the basis of Tilray’s Operations
Statements and the CSA Statement.332
Examining the Operations Statements, Tilray assures po-
tential investors that it does not produce or distribute mari-
juana in the United States.333 It claims it “operate[s] only in
countries where cannabis is legal[,]” in all the senses of the
330. Akerman v. Oryx Commc’ns, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), aff’d and remanded, 810 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he statute recog-
nizes that there may be cases in which a misstatement is material to an inves-
tor’s decision although it has not in fact adversely affected the value of the
stock.”).
331. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (“We cannot consider any damages caused, not by
defendants’ omissions, but by independent forces.”).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 214-215 for the text of these state-
ments.
333. Tilray, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 24 (July 18, 2018).
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word.334 Therefore, although Tilray engages in accounting, le-
gal, and creative services in the U.S.,335 it takes the position
that it does not “operate” there. The questions then become
whether this is a misstatement, and if it is, whether it is a mate-
rial one.
Arguably, a statement that Tilray only “operates” in coun-
tries where it is legal to do so is a misstatement. A court could
certainly consider conducting “certain corporate and adminis-
trative services, including accounting, legal and creative ser-
vices[,]”336 to constitute “operations.” If so, then Tilray does
indeed operate in the United States, where it is not permitted
under both state337 and federal law to do so. Might a reasona-
ble investor care about where a Retail Marijuana Corporation
operates? Yes—it would certainly affect that investor’s calculus
of the legal risks the company (and potentially the investor)
might face. For example, could the provision of these services
in the U.S. constitute engaging in or affecting interstate or for-
eign commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity so as
to create potential RICO liability?338 Statements about where
Tilray operates could potentially alter the total mix of informa-
tion about Tilray available to the investor and, therefore,
would be material.339 Thus, the seemingly pedestrian Opera-
334. Id. at 76.
335. Id. at 24.
336. Id.
337. As mentioned above, Tilray is incorporated in Delaware and has of-
fices in Seattle. Though Seattle has legalized both medical and recreational
marijuana sales, Delaware has authorized only medical marijuana sales. See
State Marijuana Laws in 2019 Map, supra note 39. Thus, to the extent Tilray is
engaged in the retail marijuana business, it could be violating both state and
federal law.
338. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (2018).
339. The argument that this is a material misstatement is, admittedly, a
stretch. In examining a registration statement for Section 11 purposes, the
“central inquiry” is “whether defendants’ representations, taken together
and in context, would have [misled] a reasonable investor about the nature
of the investment.” I. Meyer Pincus & Assocs., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
936 F.2d 759, 761 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). Moreover, courts read
the registration statement or prospectus “as a whole.” Olkey v. Hyperion
1999 Term Tr., 98 F.3d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1996). “The touchstone of the inquiry is
not whether isolated statements within a document were true, but whether
defendants’ representations or omissions, considered together and in con-
text, would affect the total mix of information and thereby mislead a reason-
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tions Statements may not be of much interest to another type
of corporation, but they take on increased significance for a
Tilray investor because Tilray is a Retail Marijuana Corpora-
tion.
Tilray makes a variety of disclosures in its Risk Factors dis-
cussion that a Section 11 defendant could argue vitiates any
claim on the basis of the Operations Statements. For example,
Tilray cites the possibility of “significant fines, penalties, ad-
ministrative sanctions, convictions or settlements arising from
civil proceedings initiated by either the U.S. federal govern-
ment or private citizens or criminal charges, including, but not
limited to, disgorgement of profits, cessation of business activi-
ties or divestiture” as a result of violating any U.S. federal laws
or regulations.340 However, Section 11 plaintiffs must prove
that the securities they purchased are traceable to the defec-
tive registration statement, not that they read and relied upon
the defective registration statement. If a court found the state-
ment in the “Business” section of Tilray’s registration state-
ment that Tilray only operates where marijuana-related activi-
ties are legal to be a material misstatement, it likely would not
find that misstatement to have been overcome by language
elsewhere that raises the risk of potential liability the company
may face, as that statement of risk does not speak to, or alter,
the specific statement that Tilray only operates where mari-
juana activities are legal.
It would be a different situation if, on one page, Tilray’s
registration statement stated, “We only operate where selling
marijuana is legal,” and on three other pages it stated, “We
operate in many places—some in which selling marijuana is
legal, and some in which it isn’t.” In that case, reading the
registration statement as a whole, a court would likely find the
lone “We only operate where selling marijuana is legal” to be
immaterial given the “total mix” of information in the registra-
tion statement. But to say that “We only operate where selling
marijuana is legal” is tempered by “We could be subject to a
able investor regarding the nature of the securities offered.” Halperin v.
Ebanker USA.com., Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2002). Then again,
Tilray’s prospectus as a whole gives the impression that Tilray does not oper-
ate in the United States, which is why it believes it is not subject to the CSA.
It is therefore at least arguable that the Operations Statements are material.
340. Tilray, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 24 (July 18, 2018).
It also raises the specter of aiding and abetting liability for U.S. investors. Id.
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variety of civil and criminal liability” is not the same—the cau-
tion does not correct or modify the misstatement.
The CSA Statement is a similarly appealing target for a
Section 11 plaintiff, especially if a court later holds Tilray sub-
ject to the CSA. It is also the type of statement that other simi-
larly situated Retail Marijuana Corporations might make in
their registration statement. However, the CSA Statement actu-
ally presents a more difficult case for a Section 11 plaintiff.
Even if a court ultimately decides that Tilray is subject to the
CSA, an honestly held opinion is not a material misstatement
of fact simply because it is later proven to be wrong; a state-
ment of opinion is actionable under Section 11 only if the
plaintiff can prove that it was not honestly held.341 Moreover,
an opinion on legal compliance does not become a materially
misleading omission under Section 11 unless the “registration
statement omits material facts about the issuer’s inquiry into
or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those
facts conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from
the statement itself . . . .”342 Thus, a Section 11 plaintiff would
have a difficult time attacking Tilray’s CSA Statement unless
the plaintiff could prove, for example, that Tilray had not con-
sulted its lawyers regarding its potential exposure to the CSA,
or that its lawyers had advised Tilray that it likely is subject to
the CSA, or some similar fact that undermines Tilray’s claim
that it was an honest, if mistaken, belief.343
341. See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension
Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 1327 (2015) (“[A] sincere statement of pure opinion
is not an ‘untrue statement of material fact,’ regardless whether an investor
can ultimately prove the belief wrong.”). In Omnicare, the company’s registra-
tion statement contained statements of opinion in which the company ex-
pressed the belief that it was not violating anti-kickback laws, accompanied
by caveats that its interpretation of the law could prove incorrect. Id. at
1323–24. After the federal government brought suits against Omnicare for
violation of those laws, investors brought a Section 11 suit, claiming that the
company’s statements about legal compliance were materially false. Id. at
1324. The Supreme Court declined to view the legal opinions contained in
the company’s registration statement as material misstatements because the
plaintiffs did not challenge the sincerity of the company’s belief. Id. at 1327.
The Court remanded on the question of the alleged omission under the new
standard the Court expressed. Id. at 1333.
342. Id. at 1329.
343. See id. at 1328–29.
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If any of Tilray’s statements or omissions were plausibly
attacked in a Section 11 suit, the most likely line of defense for
Tilray’s directors would be the due diligence defense. Because
the Operations Statements and the CSA Statement are in non-
expertised portions of the registration statement (i.e., the Bus-
iness and Risk Factors sections) the defendant directors would
have to prove that they (1) conducted a reasonable investiga-
tion; (2) had reasonable ground to believe; and (3) actually
did believe, at the time the registration statement became ef-
fective, that the statements made in the registration were true
and complete. Under the circumstances, it would be challeng-
ing to mount this defense.
Regarding the Operations Statements, the directors
would have to show that they conducted a reasonable investi-
gation into where Tilray operates and reasonably and actually
did believe that Tilray does not operate in the U.S. Given the
fact that Tilray has offices in Seattle and acknowledges con-
ducting certain business activities in the United States, this
would be a difficult claim to make. In the unlikely event that
Tilray’s lawyers engaged the directors in a discussion of the
term “operate” and provided a legal opinion that Tilray’s vari-
ous activities in the U.S. do not constitute operations, the di-
rectors might have a reasonable basis for believing the state-
ment to be true. Otherwise, it would be hard for even an
outside director to establish a reasonable belief about the Op-
erations Statements.
The due diligence defense would be more likely success-
ful in the context of the CSA Statement (assuming a court
somehow found the CSA Statement actionable under the Su-
preme Court’s standard). The defense would naturally be fact
intensive, but the defendant directors could plausibly point to
corporate records of meetings with lawyers in which they dis-
cussed Tilray’s exposure to the CSA and the basis for the legal
opinion that Tilray is not subject thereunder. Even finding
that Tilray’s lawyers disagreed about whether Tilray is subject
to the CSA would not be fatal to the directors’ defense so long
as the directors could still show it was reasonable for them to
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believe (and they actually did believe) that Tilray is not subject
to the statute.344
The obligation to be entirely truthful in the registration
statement is not unique to Retail Marijuana Corporations;
every issuer of registered securities has the same obligation
and the same potential Section 11 liability for misstatements or
omissions. And yet, the unsettled state of the law makes it
somewhat more likely that investors will seek redress from Re-
tail Marijuana Corporations under the securities laws, espe-
cially if the federal government decides to enforce federal
criminal laws against Retail Marijuana Corporations. This
means that Retail Marijuana Corporations will need to be even
more careful than other types of issuers because aspects of
their business—such as where they have offices—will take on
more significance than they would for issuers that do not regu-
larly engage in conduct banned under federal law. Even if
there is not a strong case under Section 11 against Tilray (or
similar issuers) on the basis of these selected statements, Sec-
tion 11 claims are easier to bring than Rule 10b-5 claims, and
Retail Marijuana Corporations and those acting on their be-
half are likely to be appealing targets. Accordingly, Retail Mari-
juana Corporations—more so than companies that operate
more squarely in compliance with the law—must exercise
great care to ensure that there are no statements or omissions
that could potentially give rise to liability under Section 11 and
the other antifraud provisions.
CONCLUSION
In light of the smorgasbord of possible liability sources for
directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations, someone who
chooses to accept a directorship in a Retail Marijuana Corpo-
ration must be either fearless by nature, particularly commit-
ted to the cause of legalizing retail marijuana, or downright
foolhardy. Even if many of the theories of liability outlined in
this Article are difficult to plead and prove, the costs of de-
fending against them are high, both in terms of dollars and
also in terms of managerial attention and opportunity costs.
Rather than defend against shareholder litigation, many com-
344. See id. at 1329 (providing an example in which a single junior attor-
ney disagrees with six of his more senior colleagues and concluding that the
statement of opinion would not thereby be rendered misleading).
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panies settle, even when their chances of prevailing at trial are
relatively good.345 With the greater prospect of defending
against litigation and personal liability comes a greater chal-
lenge in finding qualified people willing to serve as direc-
tors.346 This is problematic for the welfare of Retail Marijuana
Corporations and particularly for their investors, who rely
upon directors to safeguard their investments. There runs the
risk that the best qualified, most experienced directors will
stick to running more mainstream companies, while less ex-
perienced or less qualified directors take the helm of Retail
Marijuana Corporations, potentially as “passion projects.”
The situation becomes more tenuous the longer it contin-
ues. Some early investors in retail marijuana businesses are
venture capitalists, accelerator companies, and other sophisti-
cated investors.347 Others are partakers in recreational mari-
345. See Amy M. Koopmann, Note, A Necessary Gatekeeper: The Fiduciary Du-
ties of the Lead Plaintiff in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 34 J. CORP. L. 895,
912 (2008-2009) (“Litigation is expensive, and settling a case, even a case
that would not succeed on its merits, can be less expensive than the costs of
getting the case dismissed, and certainly less expensive than going to trial.”)
(footnotes omitted); Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors,
and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945,
950 (Mar. 1993) (“[T]here is increasing evidence that settlement is inevita-
ble where judgment on the pleadings or a quick summary judgment cannot
be obtained, and that the amounts paid in settlement are in large part unre-
lated to the merits of the action.”); Dionne Searcey & Ashby Jones, First the
Merger; then the Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704482704576072050216781160.html (describing
settlement of frivolous “strike” suits in connection with mergers and acquisi-
tions).
346. See Martin J. Lipton, Keynote Address to the 25th Annual Institute on
Federal Securities: Shareholder Activism and the “Eclipse of the Public Cor-
poration” 6 (Feb. 7, 2007), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2007/02/20070210%20Lipton%20Address.pdf (“The growth of
shareholder litigation against directors coupled with the media attention
and reputational damage to the directors who are sued, and in part to all
directors, affects the willingness of the most highly qualified people to serve
as directors.”).
347. See Melissa Pistilli, Early Stage US Cannabis Companies Offering Opportu-
nity for Accelerators, CANNABIS INVESTING NEWS (Apr. 7, 2019), https://invest-
ingnews.com/daily/cannabis-investing/financing-early-stage-us-cannabis-
companies/; Brett Relander, Funding Platforms for Marijuana Startups, INVES-
TOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/030515/fund-
ing-platforms-emerging-marijuana-startups.asp (last updated Jun. 25, 2019).
2020] HIGH CRIMES 501
juana use who believe in its legalization.348 Still others may be
entrepreneurs’ friends and family members.349 Some of these
investors are well positioned to analyze investments and to
take calculated risks, but others are unsophisticated (in inves-
tor terms) and more in need of reliance upon the safeguards
afforded by competent and experienced directors.350
As investing in marijuana companies becomes more nor-
malized, so too will exposure to Retail Marijuana Corpora-
tion’s securities become more widespread. For example, mu-
tual funds may begin to invest money in Retail Marijuana Cor-
porations’ securities, potentially without their fund investors’
knowledge that they are now exposed to marijuana-related se-
curities.351 Or companies that had not been Retail Marijuana
Corporations may start investing in marijuana businesses, like
Constellation’s investment in Canopy Growth.352 If the winds
change and the federal government begins enforcing the CSA
against Retail Marijuana Corporations, investor losses could be
substantial as Retail Marijuana Corporations go bankrupt or
dissolve—whether voluntarily or involuntarily. This will likely
open the litigation floodgates, not unlike the collateralized
348. For example, rapper Snoop Dogg is a director of a venture capital
fund that invests in marijuana-related start-ups. See Relander, supra note 347.
Snoop Dogg is also a known marijuana user who favors its legalization. See
Shirley Halperin, Snoop Dogg on Teen Son’s Pot Use: “He’s Learning from the
Master”, HOLLYWOOD REP. (SEPT. 26, 2012, 12:19 P.M. PDT), https://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/news/snoop-dogg-son-pot-obama-marijuana-
374384.
349. See Frank Robinson, Going Green: Legal Considerations for Marijuana In-
vestors and Entrepreneurs, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 57, 80 (2016) (surmising that
“bootstrapping as well as friends and family are the largest source of funds”
for Retail Marijuana Corporations).
350. See Nigam Arora, How to Make, and Avoid Losing, Money with Marijuana
Stocks, MARKETWATCH (Jul. 24, 2018, 3:01 p.m. ET) (“[M]any unsophistica-
ted investors are being drawn into cannabis stocks.”); Beware of the Next Big
Investment, WASH. STATE DEP’T FIN. INST. (Nov. 10, 2015), https://dfi.wa.gov/
consumer/alerts/beware-next-big-investment (“Marijuana investment op-
portunities could be particularly susceptible to scams . . . .”). But see Caleb
Silver, Who’s Interested in Marijuana Stocks?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.inves-
topedia.com/news/whos-interested-marijuana-stocks/ (last updated Jun. 25,
2019).
351. See Fein, supra note 205, at 22–38 (regarding trustees’ and other fidu-
ciaries’ duties in connection with investments in marijuana-related securi-
ties).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 140–143 regarding Constellation’s
investment.
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debt obligation backlash in the wake of the 2008 financial cri-
sis.353
This situation begs for a legislative solution. While state
courts can define their own state causes of action to exclude
state-sanctioned retail marijuana activity and state legislatures
can craft statutes that prevent unintended consequences from
befalling Retail Marijuana Corporations,354 states cannot rede-
fine federal statutes to insulate Retail Marijuana Corporations
from liability. In the current political climate, the cause of pro-
tecting directors of Retail Marijuana Corporations from per-
sonal liability is unlikely to inspire many Members of Congress
to take legislative action, but the causes of clarifying the law,
protecting investors, and resolving an “untenable” situation
might.
353. See Jonathan Stempel, Citigroup Settles Shareholder CDO Lawsuit for $590
Million, REUTERS (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ci-
tigroup-settlement/citigroup-settles-shareholder-cdo-lawsuit-for-590-million-
idUSBRE87S0UA20120830; The Financial Crisis 10 Years Later: Lessons
Learned, PAUL, WEISS (Sept. 15, 2018), https://www.paulweiss.com/prac-
tices/litigation/financial-institutions/publications/the-financial-crisis-10-
years-later-lessons-learned?id=27324.
354. See Newell, supra note 74, at 1392–93 (suggesting a state legislative
solution to the illegal purpose doctrine); Scheuer, supra note 23, at 551–54
(proposing an exception to state business entity and related laws to prevent
CSA violations from vitiating state business entity protections).
